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ARTICLES

GENETIC DATABASES AND BIOBANKS: WHO
CONTROLS OUR GENETIC PRIVACY?
Yael Bregman-Eschett
Abstract
A growing number of private biotech companies have been
collecting and storing our genetic information and bodily tissues and
linking it to life-long medical histories. Many of these companies have
close relationships with the public sector: they rely on public
institutions to get access to certain medical data and tissue samples,
while the public sector relies on those companies for commercial
exploitation of the research. Despite the unique nature of the
information collected and the sensitivity of genetic databases, these
private bio-librariesare largely unregulated in the UnitedStates.
This article examines who has control over the assembly, use,
and dissemination of genetic information in various types of genetic
databases, and how this power should be managed based on its
effects on the privacy and autonomy interests of individuals. The
article analyzes three examples: the Icelandic Health Sector
Database, the U.K. Biobank, and the operation of private,
commercial bio-repositories in the United States. Via these examples,
the article examines the increased involvement of the private sector
that collects and stores medical and genetic information and the
growing partnershipsbetween the private and public sectors in the
genetic realm. This analysis reveals the potential for abuse of
personal genetic information by those who have control over it, and
the need to place limitations on the uses of this information. This
article calls for the adoption of industry-wide fair information
practices and proposes a set offair information principles tailoredto
meet the specific privacy needs in the genetic realm.
J.S.D. Candidate, Olin Fellow, CIRM Fellow, University of California at Berkeley; J.S.M.,
Stanford University, 2004; LL.B., University of Haifa, Israel, 2002. 1 wish to thank Pamela
Samuelson for her guidance in developing this article, and Paul Schwartz, Michael Birnhack,
David Winickoff, Theo Bregman, and Gal Eschet for valuable comments on earlier drafts of this
article.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2000, two teams - one privately owned and the other publicly
funded - announced of the mapping of the human genome.1 In the
wake of this scientific breakthrough, and the better understanding of
various genetic disorders and physical and psychological traits that it
promised, expectations for the development of new treatments and
cures for various medical conditions has grown tremendously. The
Human Genome Project was therefore accompanied by multiple
superlatives: the genome itself was described as the "book of life" and
the mapping of the human genome was compared to the search for the
Holy Grail.2 However, this new genetic research also posed a growing
threat to personal privacy, as vast amounts of medical and genetic
information could now be better understood, compiled, and linked
together.
In this era of information technology, hospitals, research
institutions, and other pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies
are establishing huge databanks containing the medical information
and biological material of individuals, and linking this data with
sensitive genetic information. This massive compilation of medical
data, linked to genetic material and information, notwithstanding its
benefit to the provision of health care and the optimization of genetic
research, poses significant privacy concerns. The fact that our private
genetic information is often times out of our personal control,
combined with the lack of adequate safeguards to ensure the privacy
of this information by those who do control it, greatly increases these
concerns.
Genetic databases, 3 biobanks, 4 and population collections 5 are
already here, most probably to stay. The United States, the United

I. KEVIN DAVIES, CRACKING THE GENOME: INSIDE THE RACE TO UNLOCK HUMAN
DNA 6 (2d ed. 2002); LOR B. ANDREWS, MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN, & MARK A. ROTHSTEIN,
GENETICS: ETHICS, LAW AND POLICY, 31-33 (West Group 2002).
2.
THE CODE OF CODES: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME

PROJECT (Daniel J. Kevles & Leroy Hood eds., Harvard University Press 1992); RICHARD
LEWONTIN, IT AIN'T NECESSARILY So: THE DREAM OF THE HUMAN GENOME

AND OTHER

ILLUSIONS, 133-96 (2d ed. 2001) (refuting the use of the Holy Grail metaphor).
3. Genetic databases refer to the storage of genetic information obtained from the
analysis of tissue samples. Jean E. McEwen, DNA Databanks, in GENETIC SECRETS:
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA, 231 (Mark A. Rothstein

ed., 1997).
4. Biobanks (also named DNA databanks) refer to databases in which the actual tissue
samples and biological material are stored, not just the genetic information derived thereof. Id.
5. The term "population collections" started to emerge at the beginning of 2000, as a
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Kingdom, Iceland, Canada, and Estonia are some examples of
countries in which genetic databases already exist or are currently
being developed. Of these, there are different types of genetic
databases with diverse goals at heart. Forensic, 6 military, 7
commercial,8 and research databases, 9 are a few that come to mind.
There are also various modes of control over genetic information:
public, private, and a hybrid of the two - with the private sector
relying on the public sector to get access to the data, and the public
sector relying on the private one for commercial exploitation of the
research. 1
The Icelandic government, for instance, granted deCode
Genetics Inc. (deCode), a private, for-profit company, a 12-year
license to create an electronic database of the medical records of the
entirety of the Icelandic population, to be linked to Iceland's
genealogical database and a genetic database created by the company

result of the growing number of proposals to establish collections of medical and genetic
information pertaining to whole communities. Population collections hold the medical
information and DNA samples from whole populations, whether a whole country as in the case
of the Icelandic Health Sector Database, or regions of a country, such as in the case
Newfoundland in Canada. See Jane Kaye, Abandoning Informed Consent: The Case of Genetic
Research in Population Collections, in GENETIC DATABASES: SOCIO-ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE
COLLECTION AND USE OF DNA, 120 (Richard Tutton & Oonagh Corrigan eds. 2004).
6.
An example of such forensic databases is the establishment of the federal CODIS
database in order to facilitate the apprehension of criminals. See infra section III.A.
7.
The United States military is another example of a governmentally controlled biobank
in which DNA samples of soldiers are being stored for the purpose of identifying the remains of
missing soldiers. For further discussion see McEwen, supra note 3, at 239-40.
8.
The number of private, commercial biobanks consisting of DNA and tissue samples is
rapidly growing. Examples of commercial companies running private biobanks include
Genomics Collaborative Inc., GolfStream Bioinformatics (formally Ardais Corporation), and
DNA Sciences, Inc. Each of these companies holds thousands of samples, which are being used
for the companies' commercial gain. See Jocelyn Kaiser, Population Databases Boom, From
Iceland to the U.S., 298 SCI. 911, 1158-59 (2002); Robin Marantz Henig, The Genome in Black
and White (and Gray), N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 10, 2004, at 47.
9.
The Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP) is a good example of a proposed
DNA database for research purposes. The purpose of this worldwide project was to sample and
archive human genetic diversity, and especially samples from indigenous populations "as the
first step towards 'enormous leaps in our grasp of human origins, evolution, prehistory, and
potential."' Jenny Reardon, The Human Genome Diversity Project: A Case Study in
Coproduction, 31 SOC. STUD. SCa. 357 (2001). This project had failed due to the resistance
voiced by indigenous groups that dubbed the project as the "Vampire Project." Id at 358.
Recently, however, attempts have been made to revive the HGDP by the National Geographic
Society and I.B.M. Nicholas Wade, GeographicSociety Is Seeking A Genealogy of Humankind,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2005, at A16. For additional information on the National Geographic
Genographic Project see http://www.nationalgeographic.com/ (last visited Nov. 2006).
10.
Alan Petersen, Securing Our Genetic Health: Engendering Trust in UK Biobank, 27
Soc. HEALTH & ILLNESS 271, 276 (2005).
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itself.11 The United Kingdom is currently in the midst of establishing
the world's largest biobank, with samples taken from 500,000
volunteers. 12 The information collected by the U.K. Biobank is to be
linked to the medical records and other health and life-style
information of the participants.' 3 And in the United States, private,
commercial companies are establishing huge, private bio-repositories
containing tissue samples linked to medical information and
history,
4
collected directly from patients or received from hospitals.1
The analysis of these three examples reveals the potential abuses
of some of our most personal and sensitive information by both public
and private entities, and suggests the need to establish industry-wide
fair information practices that will address the specific problems that
arise from the collection and storage of genetic information and the
linkage of this information to other types of personal information.
Moreover, the analysis of these three examples - the Icelandic Health
Sector Database, the U.K. Biobank, and the operation of private,
commercial bio-repositories in the United States - accentuates the
need to redefine the status of those who control such sensitive
information, preferably assigning them as trustees, not owners, of the
medical and genetic information they collect and compile.
This article deals with this very question of control. It examines
who has control over the assembly, use, and dissemination of
information from various types of genetic databases, e.g., public and
private databases, and suggests how this power might be managed,
taking into account its effects on the privacy and autonomy interests
of individuals. Three key terms are used throughout the article:
genetic privacy, autonomy, and property rights. The term genetic
11.
Act on a Health Sector Database, no. 139/1998 (passed on Dec. 17, 1998), Art. 5(9),
http://ministryofhealth.is/laws-and-regulations/nr/659#allt (Iceland) [hereinafter HSD Act]. This
database, however, never materialized. See David Winickoff, Genome and Nation: Iceland's
Health Sector Database and its Legacy, INNOVATIONS:

TECHNOLOGY,

GOVERNANCE,

GLOBALIZATION, MIT Press, vol. 1(2), pages 80-105 (April 2006). See also the discussion in
section IV.A below.
12. See http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about/overview.php (last visited Nov. 2006).
13.
Interim Advisory Group on Ethics and Governance, UK Biobank Ethics and
Governance Framework: BackgroundDocument, at 3, 7 (2003),
http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/docs/egf-background.doc; UK Biobank Ethics and Governance
Framework, Version 2.0, Section I.B.2 (2006),
http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/docs/EGF%20Version2%2OMay%202006.pdf.
14. These companies include: Genomics Collaborative Inc., GolfStream Bioinformatics
(formally Ardais Corporation), Gene Logic, and others. See Graham Lewis, Tissue Collection
and the PharmaceuticalIndustry: Investigating Corporate Biobanks, in GENETIC DATABASES:
SOCIO-ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE COLLECTION AND USE OF DNA 181, 188-90 (Richard Tutton &

Oonagh Corrigan eds., 2004).
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privacy applies the concept of privacy to genetic-related findings and
refers to the use of personal data derived from one's genes."
Autonomy, or bioautonomy, describes one's decisional power over
her genetic information and the uses made of it.1 6 Lastly, property
rights refer to interests in an object (in this article: one's genes,
tissues, or information derived
thereof) that are attached to said
17
traded.
be
can
that
and
object,
Section II of this article will address the ongoing debate as to
whether genetic information is in fact different from other types of
medical information. It will explain the threats to personal privacy
posed by the growing number of bio-repositories and by their linkage
to other medical and genetic databases, particularly if owned by
private entities. Section III will examine several public and private
bio-repositories already existing in the United States. It also explores
some of the potential abuses of genetic information stored in large
databases and biobanks, and explains the need for the implementation
of fair information practices for the accumulation, use, access, and
transfer of the genetic information stored in such databases.
Section IV will use the Icelandic Health Sector Database as a
case study to explore new collaborative enterprises between
governmental and commercial entities and the merger of knowledge
accumulated in public and private repositories. It identifies the risks
and benefits of such collaborations, and compares the Icelandic model
based on commercial exploitation, to the United Kingdom's public
ownership model, finding that the latter is a better formulation to
protect the autonomy and genetic privacy of individuals. Finally,
conclusions drawn from the Icelandic and British examples will be
applied to the American landscape. The inductions made from the two
15.
Anita Allen portrays the term "genetic privacy" as consistent of four dimensional
aspects: 1) informational privacy that relates to access to personal information; 2) physical
privacy, which relates to access to persons and personal spaces; 3) decisional privacy, which
relates to governmental or other third party interference with personal choices; and 4)
proprietary privacy that relates to ownership interests in the human body. See Anita L. Allen,
Genetic Privacy: Emerging Concepts and Values, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY

AND CONFIDENTIALITY INTHE GENETIC ERA 31, 33-34 (Mark Rothstein ed., 1997).
16. See David E. Winickoff, Governing Population Genomics: Law, Bioethics, and
Biopolitics in Three Case Studies, 43 JURIMETRICS J.187, 189 (2003) (defining bioinformation
as "phenotypic information drawn from medical records and genotypic information drawn from
tissue samples").
17.

See Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and PersonalData, 117 HARV. L. REV.

2056, 2058 (2004) [hereinafter Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data] (defining
"property" as "any interest in an object, whether tangible or intangible, that is enforceable
against the world. From this perspective, property rights run with the object, and can be
contrasted with contract rights, which bind only parties in privity.").
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foreign case studies, when applied to the United States, emphasize the
need to place limitations and safeguards in the form of self-regulation
that will address the specific privacy concerns raised in the
information technology - genetic era. A set of fair information
principles tailored to the specific concerns raised by genetic databases
and biobanks is therefore suggested.
II. GENETIC DATABASES: A NEW THREAT TO PRIVACY?
Medical data is considered to be highly sensitive, personal
information. According to the Ninth Circuit, "[o]ne can think of few
subject areas more personal and more likely to implicate privacy
interests than that of one's health or genetic make-up." 18 Despite the
sensitive and personal nature of medical information, certain
proponents of the free market, namely Richard Posner and Richard
Epstein, call for open access to medical and genetic information in the
name of economic efficiency. 19 However, open access to both medical
and genetic information may have far reaching social implications in
the form of social stigma and genetic determinism that may lead to
problems such as employment and insurance discrimination, which
are socially as well as economically undesirable. 20 For this reason, the
free market may fail to adequately protect medical privacy.2' Medical
information thus requires considerable privacy protections and
confidentiality, necessities long recognized by the Hippocratic Oath. 2

18.
19.

Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998).
See Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978); Richard A.

Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination:Old Responses to New Technology,
74 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1994).
20. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of PersonalHealth Care Information,
76 TEx. L. REV. 1, 25-31 (1997) [hereinafter Schwartz, Economics of PersonalHealth Care
Information]; Allen, supra note 15, at 33-34.
21. See Schwartz, Economics of PersonalHealth Care Information, supranote 20, at 4251 (indicating three main reasons for the market failure to adequately protect medical privacy:
lack of public knowledge regarding the use and treatment of personal data; an agency problem;
and a collective action problem). See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON:
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 81-87 (New York University Press

2004) (listing four misgivings of the market in protecting personal data: the limitations of
contract law; problems with bargaining power; the one-size-fits-all problem; and inequalities in
knowledge).
22. The Hippocratic Oath was originally written approximately 2,400 years ago (400
B.C.E.) in ancient Greece, and it declares: "What I may see or hear in the course of the
treatment or even outside of the treatment in regard to the life of men, which on no account one
must spread abroad, I will keep to myself, holding such things shameful to be spoken about."
See Nova Online, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/doctors/oathclassical.html (last visited Nov.
2006).
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Genetic information is a sub-class of medical information. 23 It
includes information that may be retrieved from an individual's DNA
that, with the growing understanding of the human genome and its
mapping, may reveal three levels of sensitive information: personal
information about the individual such as genes, traits, and
predisposition to certain diseases; medical information about an
individual's kinship that can be attributed to one's genes; and
information about the heritage of the individual, e.g. the routes and
origin of her ancestors.
Despite the sensitivity of the information that may be retrieved
from one's DNA and tissue samples, the degree of privacy protection
that should be granted to genetic information is disputed. Bioethicist
George Annas considers genetic information to be especially sensitive
medical information because of the different levels of personal
information it may reveal: not only about the individual, but also
regarding her relatives.24 According to Annas, our DNA is a reflection
of our "future diaries," with the 25ability to reveal predisposition to
illnesses, traits, and even life span.
However, this "future diary" metaphor has been widely
contested by others.26 It has been argued that "genetic information is
Although not all genetic information is necessarily a secret (e.g., the color of one's
23.
eyes or hair), if privacy is conceptualized as more than the classical secrecy paradigm, as
suggested by Solove, genetic information may be viewed as private information. SOLOVE,supra
note 21, at 143 (stating that "we must abandon the secrecy paradigm. Privacy involves an
expectation of a certain degree of accessibility of information. Under this alternative view,
privacy entails control over and limitations on certain uses of information, even if the
information is not concealed."). See infra section III.C.2, explaining the need for different levels
of protection for genetic information according to the degree of sensitivity of the information.
This special sensitivity arises, according to Annas, because genetic information
24.
encompasses in it private information about one's self, about our relatives, and is important to
private decision-making. See George J. Annas, Genetic Privacy: There Ought to be a Law, 4
TEXAS REV. L. & POL. 9, 9-10 (1999). For the opposite view see George Poste, Privacy and
Confidentiality in the Age of Genetic Engineering, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 25, 28 (1999)
(arguing that the distinction between genetic data and other classes of medical information is
false); and Thomas H. Murray, Genetic Exceptionalism and "Future Diaries": Is Genetic
Information Different from Other Medical Information?, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY INTHE GENETIC ERA 60 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997).
Annas, supra note 24, at 11-12.
See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Genetics and Privacy, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 17, 22
26.
(1999) (arguing that the "future diary" metaphor does not hold: first because actual diaries are
much more diverse than one's genetic makeup; and secondly because while diaries contain
thoughts on past occurrences, DNA can reveal only probabilities). See also Murray, supra note
24; Allen, supra note 15, at 49-51; Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination,Genetic Privacy:
Rethinking Employee Protectionsfor a Brave New Workplace, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1497, 153237 (2002) (suggesting a different metaphor that compares human genes to the raw material input
into a production process).
25.
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neither unique nor distinctive in its ability to offer probabilistic peeks
into our future health,, 27 and that any potential difference between
genetic information and other classes of medical information is at
most that of degree, not of kind.28 Others see genetic data as distinct
from other types of medical information, but not unique. 29 Similarly,
the Ninth Circuit concluded, in a majority opinion, that a blood
sample is not substantially different than fingerprinting. 30 However, in
a dissenting opinion Judge Nelson found that: "DNA genetic pattern
analysis catalogs uniquely private genetic facts about the individual
that should be subject to rigorous confidentiality requirements even
broader than the protection of an individual's medical records, 3 1 thus
differentiating genetic information from other classes of medical data
or fingerprint records.32
When referring to genetic databanks, one must distinguish
between two types of repositories: genetic databases, which consist of
information derived from individual genetic material and DNA; and
DNA banks or biobanks that hold collections of tissue samples, such
as blood, saliva, or hair, from which DNA can be derived.33 Both
types of banks pose potential threats to privacy: genetic databases do
so via the accumulation of genetic information in a single electronic
form; while DNA banks allow for the possibility of making endless
amounts of DNA copies from one single tissue sample for different
uses, some of which might not have been originally consented to.
Computerization and the creation of electronic dossiers is one of
the greatest challenges to medical and genetic privacy in the
information technology age.34 The computerization of medical records
27. Murray, supra note 24, at 64.
28. Ginsburg, supra note 26, at 18.
29. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 451, 489-92
(1995).
30. See Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995), in which the majority concluded
that obtaining a blood sample from a convicted felon or a sex offender is not substantially
different from fingerprinting.
31. Id. at 1569.
32. See Jeffrey S.Grand, The Blooding of America: Privacy and the DNA Dragnet, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 2277, 2288-89 (2000) (rejecting the analogy of genetic makeup to
fingerprints as being too simplistic and stating that: "biological samples volunteered in DNA
dragnets have the potential to reveal far more intimate information about the individual donor
than a simple fingerprint.").
33.
Murray, supra note 24, at 63-64; McEwen, supra note 3, at 231; Human Genetics
Commission, Inside Information: Balancing Interests in the Use of Personal Genetic Data, May
2002, http://www.hgc.gov.uk/UploadDocs/DocPub/Document/insideinformation-summary.pdf
[hereinafter U.K. Human Genetics Commission].
34. Mark A. Rothstein, Medical Privacy - an Oxymoron?, NEWSDAY, Mar. 15, 1999, at
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makes the medical process more efficient, optimizes health care, and
enhances research. 35 But, the compilation of vast amounts of sensitive
data, consisting of both medical and genetic information, in a single
electronic database to which numerous people in different locations
have access, also undermines personal privacy.3 6
Biobanks, on the other hand, create a somewhat different
challenge focused on the autonomy of the individual. The ability to
store tissue and DNA samples for long periods of time and the
possibility to create endless numbers of DNA copies from a single
sample, give rise to the concern that these samples could potentially
be used for purposes other than those for which they were originally
intended.3 7 For instance, stored tissue samples collected before
genetic testing was even available, can now be used to create DNA
databanks to facilitate research that could not have been anticipate at

A25. See also SOLOVE, supranote 21, at 2-4 (discussing the problems of digital dossiers).
35.
See Gostin, supra note 29; Poste, supra note 24; Schwartz, Economics of Personal
Health CareInformation, supra note 20, at 12-15.
36.
Gostin, supra note 29, at 467-68. See also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977)
(acknowledging "the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal
information in computerized data banks or other massive government files."); SOLOVE, supra
note 21, at 131-132. For a more general description of the benefits as well as the privacy threats
associated with the Global Information Infrastructure see Larry Irving, National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, Introduction to Privacy and SelfRegulation in the Information Age (1997), stating that:
The Global Information Infrastructure has tremendous potential to bring
economic, social and cultural benefits to America and its citizens. Because it will
facilitate and expand the flow of information between people and from place to
place, the GII promises enhanced educational and employment opportunities,
greater citizen participation, and improved delivery of government services.
Information technologies promise to revolutionize the manner in which
commerce is transacted domestically and across international borders. The GII
has provided faster, cheaper, and more reliable communication of business data,
so that great distances and multiple time zones are no longer barriers to
transacting business. But while information technologies can bring these benefits
to Americans, they also present new challenges to individual privacy. Not only
does the Gil make the collection, storage, and transmission of large amounts of
personal data possible, use of the Gil creates information trails that, without
proper safeguards, could reveal the personal details of people's lives. Failure to
recognize and protect the privacy interests could slow the growth of the GIL. If
we are to realize the full potential of the information infrastructure, the legitimate
privacy interests of users of the GIl must be acknowledged and protected.
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/intro.htm (last visited Nov. 2006).
37.
Annas, supra note 24, at 13-14; Jane Kaye, Abandoning Informed Consent: The Case
of Genetic Research in Population Collections, in GENETIC DATABASES: SOCIO-ETHICAL
ISSUES IN THE COLLECTION AND USE OF DNA 117, 120 (Richard Tutton & Oonagh Corrigan
eds., 2004). Such use if unauthorized by the individual who gave the sample will theoretically
require additional consent from the patient.
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the time the sample was collected.38 According to the
recommendations of the European society of Human Genetics,
anonymous samples may be used for purposes other than those
originally intended for, provided that these samples are irreversible
and cannot be linked back to the name of the donor. 39 Along these
lines, the U.K. Human Genetics Commission found it acceptable to
conduct research on old collections of samples, for which informed
consent was not sought, as long as the samples were anonymized.4 °
Alternatively, many biobanks ask their research subjects for
open-ended permission to use their genetic information for future
research.41 This type of broad permission is a weak form of consent
because the research subject provides consent without being aware of
the specific uses for which the samples might be used, or of possible
future uses, which are yet unknown.42 Genuine informed consent can
only be given if the research subjects understand and agree to the
general nature of the research, are asked for additional consent if
different purposes are sought in the future, have the power to oppose
specific uses of their information, and the ability to withdraw from the
research at any time.43

38. Gostin, supranote 29, at 467-68.
39. Recommendations of the European Society of Human Genetics, Data Storage and
DNA Bankingfor BiomedicalResearch: Technical, Social and Ethical Issues, 11 EUR. J. HUM.
GENETICS S8, S9 (2003), available at
http://www.nature.com/ejhg/joumal/vl 1/n2s/pdf/5201115a.pdf.
40. U.K. Human Genetics Commission, supra note 33.
41.
ELISA EISEMAN ET AL., CASE STUDIES OF EXISTING HUMAN TISSUE REPOSITORIES:
"BEST PRACTICES" FOR A BIOSPECIMEN RESOURCE FOR THE GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC ERA

132-35 (2003), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RANDMG120.pdf;
David E. Winickoff & Richard N. Winickoff, The Charitable Trust as a Model for Genomic
Biobanks, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1180, 1180-81 (2003). For an analysis of the problems of
applying the requirements of informed consent in population genetics see Kaye, supra note 37,
at 120-22.
42. Winickoff & Winickoff, supra note 41. Similar concerns, particularly the inability to
fully consent to future research techniques and uses, brought the United States military, for
instance, to propose a fifty-year limitation on the length of time that blood and saliva samples
(which are collected from military personnel to facilitate the identification of missing soldiers)
are kept. In addition, soldiers who leave the service can request the destruction of the samples
collected by the military. The issue of long term sample storage was raised following concerns
that the military could potentially make additional, unauthorized uses of the genetic information
collected, such as a "dragnet" for detecting criminals, or to determine predisposition to
homosexual behavior. McEwen, supra note 3, at 239-40.
43. See SOLOVE, supra note 21, at 86 (stating that "[a] more complete range of choices
must permit individuals to express their preferences for how information will be protected, how
it will be used in the future, and with whom it will be shared."); U.K. Human Genetics
Commission, supra note 33, at 10-11. With regard to population collections, Jane Kaye
suggested that informed consent should be of the following nature: consent to the use of the
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Hence, the privacy and autonomy threats that accompany the
information technology age and its mega databases that hold immense
amounts of personal information are not necessarily new.
Nonetheless, the challenges of protecting medical and genetic privacy
have been growing. One reason is the increasing linkages between
medical information and the two types of genetic banks: genetic
databases and biobanks. These linkages, which are increasingly being
implemented to facilitate scientific progress, 44 create, absent sufficient
safeguards, new dimensions to the existing privacy concerns relating
to medical and genetic information.
Furthermore, the private sector is becoming increasingly
involved in the collection, assembly, and linkage of medical and
genetic information, both independently and through partnerships
with government or research institutions that willingly transfer
individuals' genetic material and/or information to the hands of the
private sector. 45 This partnership between the public and private
sectors is evident in the Icelandic model, as well as in private
agreements between hospitals and commercial biotech companies in
the United States.4 6
Although, the involvement of the private sector is crucial for
efficient technological development,4 7 the growing control that the
private industry has over personal medical information and genetic
material is problematic. First, unlike the public and non-profit sectors,
whose primary goals are (or at least should be) increasing pubic
welfare, the private sector is primarily concerned with its own
financial gain and the maximization of shareholder profits. Because of
this, the danger exists that, absent adequate safeguards, the private

information in a population collection and to the fact that the information will be linked to
additional databases; information regarding the organization in charge of the data collection, the

types of data that would be processed and a description of the research plan as well as the
researchers themselves should be provided; the right to withdraw from the collection at any
time; and the need to re-consent to the continued use of existing data every five years. Kaye,
supra note 37, at 130-31.

44. See Lewis, supra note 14, at 182-86 (explaining the usefulness of tissue collections
and genetic databases to the pharmaceutical industry and the health care system).
For the history of public and private sector databases and the flow of information
45.
between the two, see SOLOVE, supra note 21, at 13-21. See also Lewis, supra note 14.
46. See Lewis, supra note 14.
47. The race between private company Celera Genomics and the publicly funded Human
Genome project, which dramatically accelerated the sequencing of the human genome, is a good
example. Due to the involvement of a private company and the competition it entailed, 90% of
the sequencing was reached 5 years before the original end date. See DAVIES, supra note 1.
Enhancing technological development and promoting collaborations between the private sector
and universities was also the basis of the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980.

12

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

[l
[Vol.
23

sector may misuse this sensitive information in times of economic
crises, such as selling it in the event of bankruptcy. 48 The existing
legal framework is not always sufficient to prevent this type of
conduct, which undermines the research subjects' genetic privacy,
autonomy, and interests.49
Finally, absent sufficient restrictions and guidelines for the
storage of genetic information, each commercial company is free to
choose the level of security placed on the genetic information it
collects and stores. As a result, we are witnessing incoherency in the
manner in which sensitive information is stored and handled, a
phenomenon that not only undermines the privacy interests of the
research subjects, but is also claimed to create difficulties in the
conduct of genetic researchf 0
The growing control that private commercial companies have
over medical and genetic information and material; the lack of
sufficient safeguards in place to protect personal privacy; and
potential partnerships between the public and the private sectors that
bestow additional power to the hands of the private sector, all
intensify the threat to personal autonomy and genetic privacy. Hence,
this article calls for greater caution in the collection, usage, and
assembly of genetic information and material and its linkage to other
types of medical information. For this reason, the industry is
encouraged to embrace industry-specific fair information practices
that will place limitations and restrictions on the compilation and
usage of genetic data.
III. GENETIC DATABASES IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
SECTORS
Currently privacy reglation in the United States largely
differentiates public bio-repositories from private, commercial ones.
Hence, the following section distinguishes between the two modes of
control over bio-repositories, the various goals accompanying them,
and the available regulation that applies to each. The notion of selfregulation is thereafter introduced. It is explained why self-regulation
in the form of fair information practices is needed and how it could
enhance the level of privacy protection in both public and private
genetic repositories.

48.
49.

See infra section I1.C.4.
See U.K. Human Genetics Commission, supra note 33, at 8-9.

50.

See infra note 186.
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A. Public Sector Bio-Repositories
At present, the public sector is probably the primary collector of
genetic material. The largest collection of blood and tissue samples in
the United States, as well as in the world, currently belongs to the
National Pathology Repository of the Armed Forces Institute of
Pathology (AFIP), where 92 million human specimens dating back to
1864 are held. 51 And the British government plans to establish the
world's largest biobank with blood and tissue samples taken from
500,000 volunteers, which will be linked to their medical information
and history.52 It is not surprising, therefore, that most privacy
concerns are directed toward the government and its control over this
sensitive data. Most often the concerns regarding genetic privacy are
being raised in the insurance and employment contexts, focused on
fears of discrimination and misuse of genetic information by
insurance companies and employers. 53 Such fears also abound in the
criminal context when dealing with the creation of forensics
databases, "DNA dragnets," and the fear that they will be used in a
racial or discriminatory manner. 54
The term "DNA dragnet" describes the collection of biological
samples, such as blood or saliva, from individuals not specifically
suspected of a crime. 55 These samples are thereafter used to create
DNA profiles that are compared to a suspect's genetic profile, which
is constructed based on evidence from the crime scene.56 The first
DNA dragnet was used in England in the late 1980s following a rape
and murder case. In the course of the attempting to apprehend the
perpetrator, 4,500 blood samples from males were collected and

51.

See Armed Forces Institute of Pathology Home Page,

http://www.afip.org/Departments/repository/npr.html (last visited Nov. 2006); EISEMAN ET AL.,

supra note 41, at 161.
52. See UK Biobank Home Page, http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about/overview.php (last
visited Nov. 2006).
See, e.g., Judit Sdndor, Genetic Information: Science, Society, and Legal Norms, in
53.
SOCIETY AND GENETIC INFORMATION: CODES AND LAWS IN THE GENETIC ERA 21. 32, 43-45

(Judit Sdndor ed., 2003) (explaining that genetic discrimination is different from previous forms
of discrimination because it is based on mostly invisible attributes); GRAEME T. LAURIE,
GENETIC PRIVACY: A CHALLENGE TO MEDICO-LEGAL NORMS 129-65 (2002). The Federal

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) provides protection
against such discriminations uses of medical and genetic information.
54. Many of the DNA dragnets involve suspects belonging to a racial group such as
African-Americans. See, e.g., Grand, supra note 32, at 2278-80; Marantz Henig, supra note 8;
LAURIE supra note 53, at 171-76.
55.

Grand, supra note 32, at 2279-80, 2282-84.

56.

Id. at 2277 n.1.
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assembled by the police, until eventually the suspect was caught.57
Today, such DNA dragnets are created and used throughout the
world.58
San Diego was the first jurisdiction in the United States to
establish a DNA dragnet in the early 1990s, collecting blood and
saliva samples from hundreds of volunteers, in order to catch a serial
killer.59 In fact, one of the primary purposes of these DNA dragnets is
to expose those who refuse to participate in the sample collection.
Despite the voluntary nature of participation in a DNA dragnet,
refusal to take part in the collective efforts to find the suspect
immediately raises police suspicion. 60 Today, most states have a
system of DNA dragnets, and the specimens collected may be kept by
the state indefinitely, even though the majority of the samples are
taken from law-abiding citizens. 61 Many fear that these sample
collections, which contain the participants' DNA, may be exploited in
the future for uses other than the identification purposes they were
originally intended for.62

In addition, DNA samples are now routinely collected by the
state from people convicted of crimes such as rape and murder, or
even people charged with misdemeanor crimes. 63 Moreover, some
states allow the collection of DNA samples from those merely
arrested and not yet convicted of a crime.64 The DNA Identification
Act of 1994 authorizes the FBI to establish the national DNA
database CODIS (Combined DNA Identification System). The
CODIS database allows states to share and compare their DNA
databases, thus increasing the efficiency and probability of solving
crimes, but also undermining the privacy interests of those whose
DNA samples have been collected and stored, some of whom are not
necessarily convicted of any crime.65
One of the major privacy concerns associated with these biocollections is the possibility of unauthorized or unintended
57.

Id. at 2285; DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW

267-68 (2003).
58. DNA dragnets are created and used in the United Kingdom, Germany, France,
Australia, and the United States. Grand, supranote 32, at 2285.
59. Id. at 2278-79.
60. Id. at 2282-84; SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 57, at 274.
61.
Grand, supra note 32, at 2279-80.
62. U.K. Human Genetics Commission, supranote 33, at 12-13.
63. McEwen, supra note 3, at 232-36.
64. Id. at 232-38.
65. Id. at 236-38.
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dissemination and use of the stored samples. 66 For instance, data
collected from criminals could potentially be used for the study of
genetic disposition for violence,6 7 or genetic samples collected from
military personnel could be used 68to identify men who may be
predisposed to homosexual behavior.
Various legal measures taken in the United States attempt to
address these fears in the public sector. Participants in public sector
DNA collections are protected by the constitutional right to privacy,69
the Fourth Amendment (in cases of unreasonable search or seizure),70
the federal Protection of Human Subjects Rule (known as the
"Common Rule"), 7 1 and the privacy rule under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).72 The existing
system of checks and balances subjects "public" repositories of the
Federal government and the states to increased scrutiny. For instance,
by requiring that an Institutional Review Board (IRB) oversees
repository practices in the public sector and insures that the privacy
and confidentiality of research subjects are protected.73 In addition,
74
many states have enacted genetic privacy protection regulations.
The majority of these regulations require consent prior to the
disclosure of genetic information.75 However, only seven states
76
require consent prior to obtaining or accessing genetic information

66.

Id. at 236-40.

67.
Id. at 237-38. For more on the potential threats of studies on genetic determinism and
predisposition for violence behavior conducted in prisons see Garland E. Allen, Modern
Biological Determinism: The Violence Initiative, The Human Genome Project, and the New
Eugenics, in THE PRACTICES OF HuMAN GENETICS I (Michael Fortun & Everett Mendelsohn
eds., 1999).
68.

McEwen, supra note 3, at 239-40.

69.

Grand, supra note 32, at 2309-18.

70.

Id. at 2289-2309.

71.
45 C.F.R. § 46 (2005). The Common Rule, which applies to research conducted by
Federal agencies or using Federal money, provides regulations for human subject research and
requires that the research subjects have a right to be removed from a repository if the
information it stores is identifiable. See also EISEMAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 140-41;
Winickoff, supra note 16, at 191-92; Grand, supra note 32, at 2318-22 (suggesting that there is
need for additional regulation for governmental retention of biological samples).
72. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
73.

45 C.F.R. § 46. See also EISEMAN ET AL., supranote 41, at 126.

74. For a summary of state genetic privacy laws see National Conference of State
Legislatures Home Page, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/prt.htm (last visited
Nov. 2006).

75. 26 states have provisions requiring consent to disclose genetic information. See id.
76. These states are: Alaska, Delaware, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
and Oregon. Id.
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and just eight states require consent in order to retain genetic
information."
Yet, not all genetic databases and biobanks are under the control
of the government, and the fear of misuse should not be directed
solely at public repositories. In fact, there are a growing number of
private, commercial repositories holding genetic material and
information, which are not necessarily subject to the existing rules,
and these tissue collections are growing rapidly. In just over five
years commercial biotech companies managed to build private biorepositories containing hundred of thousands of human tissue
samples, and their subordination to the existing state and federal
privacy regulations is not always clear.7 8
B. Commercial Databanks
In the past several years a growing number of commercial
biotech companies in the United States have been collecting and
storing personal genetic information and providing pharmaceutical
companies and other research institutions for-a-fee access to their
collections and bio-libraries. 79 In fact, private biobanks may have an
advantage over public ones since they can more easily and quickly
attract venture capital. 80 As a result, some academic medical centers
have chosen, for economic reasons, to transfer their tissue samples to
private commercial hands. 8 1 These newly formed private biorepositories create various ethical challenges, including that of
invasion of privacy.
Commercial biotech companies provide an array of private, fora-fee services and products including: paternity tests, genetic testing
for predisposition for certain diseases and traits, genealogy and the
tracing of origin and ancestry, 82 pharmacogenomics, 83 and even
77. These states are: Alaska, Delaware, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, and Oregon. Id.
78.

See EISEMAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 168.

79. See Lewis, supra note 14.
80. Winickoff & Winickoff, supra note 41, at 1183. See also U.K. Human Genetics
Commission, supra note 33, at 22 (acknowledging that "the development of medicines and
treatments is largely a commercial undertaking and would be severely harmed if commercial
access were denied.").
81. Winickoff, supra note 16, at 207-17.
82. For instance, DNAPrint Genomics claims to be able to trace 85% of sub-Saharan
African Ancestry. Marantz Henig, supra note 8, at 50.
83. Pharmacogenomics is a new strand of medicine based on genetics. It was made
possible through the completion of the Human Genome Project and the human genome
sequence. The use of genomics in the search for new therapeutic treatments, it is anticipated,

GENETIC DATABASES AND BIOBANKS

2006]

private forensics using DNA to establish profiles of crime suspects
not matching any of the profiles in the federal CODIS database. 84
Private forensics is especially problematic since it may deter people
from participating in genetic research projects for fear8 5 that their
genetic information will be handed over to police officials.
For the most part, private genetic databases have one of two

purposes. 86 The first is clinical, providing for-a-fee service for
individuals who are potentially at risk for certain genetic disorders or
for individuals who desire to determine their genetic routes and
origins.8 7 The second is for the purpose of conducting research for the
development of future medical products and treatments.88 In order to
provide these services, pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies

will allow pharmaceutical companies to produce therapies better targeted to specific diseases.
See Tanuja V. Garde, Supporting Innovation in Targeted Treatments. Licenses of Right to NIHFundedResearch Tools, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 249, 252-53 (2005). However,
one problematic phenomenon observed is the growing focus on what might be termed the
genetics of race. The drug BiDil, for example, is to be the first "racial drug." The drug
developed by NitroMed is approved for the treatment of heart failure exclusively in the AfricanAmerican population after having been found to be unsafe for the general public. See Marantz
Henig, supra note 8; Stephanie Saul, U.S. to Review Heart Drug Intendedfor One Race, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 2005. Recently, the Icelandic company deCode Genetics announced that it
detected a variant of a gene that increases the risk of heart attack in African-Americans by more
than 250%. Nicholas Wade, Genetic FindStirs Debate on Race-Baced Medicine, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 2005, at A16. See also Oonagh Corrigan, Informed Consent. The Contradictory
Ethical Safeguards in Pharmacogenetics,in GENETIC DATABASES: SOCIO-ETHICAL ISSUES IN
THE COLLECTION AND USE OF DNA 78 (Richard Tutton & Oonagh Corrigan eds., 2004).
84.
In 2003 DNAPrint Genomics assisted the law-enforcement officials of Louisiana in
allocating a serial killer. While the police, based on the FBI profile, was looking for a white
male aged 25 to 35, the DNA Print indicated that the suspect was most likely African-American.
DNAPrint's DNA Witness Test ProvidedBreak in the LouisianaMulti-Agency Homicide Task
Force SerialKiller Case, June 5, 2003,
http://www.dnaprint.com/welcome/press/press-recent/2003/june_5/. For a similar event that
took place in Colorado see DNA WitnessTM Used to Guide the Investigation of the '97 Rape and
Murder of Susannah Chase, Jan. 29, 2004,
http://www.dnaprint.com/welcome/press/press recent/2004/january_29/. In California, see DNA
Witness Used to Guide the Investigation in TrailSide Murder Case in Concord California,Oct.
14, 2003, http://www.dnaprint.com/welcome/press/press-recent/2003/october_14/.
85.
The U.K. Human Genetics Commission recommended that the police and other
official bodies should not have access to genetic research databases so as not to deter people
from taking part in research projects. See U.K. Human Genetics Commission, supra note 33, at
13. The same rational should be applied to private forensics.
86.

McEwen, supra note 3, at 240-42.

87.

Id.

88.
example,
treatment
be unsafe

One trend observed is the growing focus on the genetics of race. The drug BiDil, for
is to be the first "racial drug." The drug developed by NitroMed is approved for the
of heart failure exclusively in the African-American population, after it was found to
for the general public. See supra note 83.
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have recently begun to create their own private bio-repositories
consisting of genetic information and tissue samples.89
Genomics Collaborative, Inc., a privately-held biotechnology
company established in 1998 and located in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, claims to have in its possession a repository
containing 500,000 tissue and DNA samples from 120,000 people
from all over the world. 90 GulfStream Bioinformatics, which acquired
the intellectual property assets of Ardais Corporation in the beginning
of 2006, is the owner of the Biomaterial and Information for Genomic
Research (BIGR) bio-library. The BIGR bio-library, which was
established by Ardais in 1999, contains more than 200,000 tissue
samples collected from over 18,000 donors. 9' Originally, Ardais
entered into agreements with several hospitals in the United States
including Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center at Harvard
University, Duke University Medical Center in Durham, and Maine
Medical Center in Portland, in order to broaden and advance its
library of tissue samples and information.9 2 Under these agreements
Ardais received the remains of tissue samples from surgical or other
medical procedures, for use in the company's research projects and
for its commercial purposes. Today, the BIGR bio-library resources
include the National Cancer Institute.9 3 The samples received are
linked to coded information obtained from patients' medical
records. 94
Over sixty medical institutions, pharmaceutical, and
biotech companies have access to the BIGR bio-library 95 and
reportedly the company aims to sell both
the data it compiles and the
96
tissues it maintains to interested parties.

89.

McEwen, supra note 3, at 240-42.

90.

See Genomics Collaborative Fact Sheet,

http://www.genomicsinc.com/GenomicsCollaborativeFactSheets.pdf
(last visited Nov.
2006); Mark D. Uehling, Blood, Sweat, and Tissue, Bio-IT WORLD, Mar. 17, 2004,
http://www.bioitworld.corm/archive/031704/blood.html.
91.
See BIGR fact sheet, http://www.ardais.com/pdf/GSBIGR.pdf(2006).
92.

Lewis, supra note 14, at 192; Winickoff, supra note 16, at 207-17.

93. Gulfstream Bioinformatics, http://www.ardais.com/industry-partners-resources.htm
(last visited Nov. 2006).
94.
See BIGR fact sheet, supra note 91. Participation in the BIGR bio-library is subject to
the informed consent of the donor and is based on IRB-approved protocols. See also Winickoff,
supranote 16 at 207-17.
95.

BIGR fact sheet, supra note 91.

96.
Lewis, supra note 14, at 192. This information pertains to the Ardais business model
prior to its acquisition by GulfStream Bioinformatics.
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However, despite the magnitude of private commercial genetic
repositories, 97 and the far-reaching implications they may have on
personal privacy due to the highly sensitive medical and genetic
information they contain, these privately held biobanks are
insufficiently regulated at the national level. The Common Rule98
applies only to research conducted by Federal agencies or to research
conducted by non-Federal agencies using Federal money, and the
regulations issued under HIPAA provide only a minimal level of
protection for health information.9 9 The HIPAA regulations do not
apply to all entities but only to "covered entities," '00 namely health
10 3
10 2
and health care providers.
plans,' O' health care clearinghouses,
While medical centers, such as the ones providing tissue sample to the
BIGR bio-library, are categorized as "covered entities" under HIPAA,
it is not clear that privately held bio-repositories receiving such
samples fall under any of these categories. 10 4 Companies receiving
their samples from hospitals and research institutions, like Ardais and
GulfStream Bioinformatics, may be considered "business associates"
of health care providers, but this may not provide direct protection
under the privacy rule, and thus the scope of protection entailed is
rather vague. 0 5 It is unclear, for example, that such protection would
apply in the event the company faces bankruptcy. 0 6 Furthermore, as
long as the information is in a de-identified format, as is the case in
most bio-repositories, the regulations do not apply to it, even if the
de-identification is not permanent and can be reversed.'0 7

97.

For additional examples of private bio-repositories see Lewis, supra note 14.

98.
99.

45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2005). See also supra note 71.
SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 57, at 210-17.

100.

45 C.F.R. §§ 160.102-160.103.

101.
A "health plan" is defined as "an individual or group plan that provides, or pays the
costs of, medical care ... " 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
102. A "health care clearinghouse" is defined as a public or private entity that processes
health information into various formats - either into a standard format or into specialized
formats for the need of specific entities. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
103.
A "health care provider" is defined as "a provider of medical or health services ...
and any other person or organization who furnishes, bills, or is paid for health care in the normal
course of business." 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
104.
Pew Internet and American Life Project, Exposed Online: Why the New Federal
Health Privacy Regulation Doesn't Offer Much Protection to Internet Users, Nov. 10, 2001,
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP-HPPHealthPriv_report.pdf.

105.

Id. at 10.

106.

Id. See also infra section III.C.4.

107.

45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(2). If the information becomes re-identified it becomes

subject to the regulations. Id. See also Mark A. Rothstein, Expanding the Ethical Analysis of
Biobanks, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 89, 91-92 (2005).
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Even if the HIPPA regulations prove applicable to private biolibraries, the regulations do not address several key issues; including
ownership, security, and transfer of data, which are crucial elements
to the adequate protection of personal genetic privacy and the
autonomy of bio-repositories' participants. Similarly, very few state
laws address these issues.108 Thus, in the absent of sufficient federal
or state protections and in order to respond to consumers privacy
needs,10 9 there is a need to formulate industry-specific, self-regulated,
fair information practices that offer a minimal level of acceptable
protection for genetic information, whether it is held by public or
private institutions. 10
C. Self-Regulation
Self-regulationlIIencompasses the three traditional components
of government regulation: legislation, enforcement, and adjudication.
However, under self-regulation the private sector, not the
government, carries out at least one of these components. 112 There are
many benefits to self-regulation.11 3 First, self-regulation is considered
to be quicker and easier to achieve when compared to government
regulation because it is less subject to political backlashes. As a result4
self-regulation is potentially cheaper than government regulation."1

108. For a concise summary of state genetic privacy laws see
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/prt.htm (last visited Nov. 2006).
109. Free market forces and consumer power may cause privately-held bio-libraries to
implement strong privacy-protection mechanisms (for example the Ardais/GolfStream
Bioinformatics coding system) but on its own may be problematic because of the sensitive
nature of genetics and the high transaction costs involved.
110. See Paul M. Schwartz, European Data Protection Law and Medical Privacy, in
GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 392,

393-98 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997) [hereinafter Schwartz, EuropeanData Protection Law];
SOLOVE, supra note 21, at 105 (discussing the importance of fair information practices in the
information age).
111. The term "self-regulation" may have different meanings to it: "At one end of the
spectrum, the term is used quite narrowly, to refer only to those instances where the government
has formally delegated the power to regulate, as in the delegation of securities industry oversight
to the stock exchanges. At the other end of the spectrum, the term is used when the private
sector perceives the need to regulate itself for whatever reason - to respond to consumer
demand, to carry out its ethical beliefs, to enhance industry reputation, or to level the market
playing field - and does so." Irving, supra note 36.
112. Angela J. Campbell, Self-Regulation and the Media, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 711, 714-15
(1998).
113. Id. at 715-17.
114. Critics of self-regulation criticize this point, arguing that self-regulation simply shifts
the cost of regulation from the government to the private sector, which may not be willing to
commit the needed financial resources in order to obtain vigorous self-enforcement. Id. at 718.
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Second, self-regulation may prove more flexible than government
regulation. This is particularly important when dealing with new
technologies, genetics included, that tend to evolve more quickly than
the legislature operates." 5 Third, self-regulation can be designed to
better fit the needs of specific industries, such as the biotechnology
industry. Lastly, self-regulation, which is developed by peers, may
provide better incentives for compliance. As a result of these benefits
self-regulation may be a more efficient process when compared to
government regulation for the protection of genetic privacy.
On the other hand, critics of self-regulation question the
incentives the industry has to regulate itself and doubt whether selfregulation gives sufficient attention to the needs of the public or
l6
merely promotes industry's self interests and economic goals."
Regardless of this opposition, with market demand accompanied by
some form of supervision by the government, self-regulation should
be able to provide a better privacy protection framework in the
genetic realm compared to the existing one; a framework designed for
the specific needs of this domain.
The purpose of establishing fair information practices,
implemented directly by the industry, is to promote and protect
personal privacy in bio-repositories and genetic databases and to
ensure coherent "best practices" among both public and private
repositories. Such practices are currently lacking." 7 The key
principles of fair information practices, as set out by the 1973 report
of the Secretary of the United States Department of Housing,
Education, and Welfare (HEW)" l8 and the 1980 privacy guidelines
issued by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD)"19 are notice, choice, access, security, and
See also Llewellyn J. Gibbons, No Regulation, Government Regulation, or Self115.
Regulation. Social Enforcement or Social Contracting for Governance in Cyberspace, 6
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 475, 509-10 (1997); Gal Eschet, F1Ps and PETs for RFID:
ProtectingPrivacy in the Web of Radio Frequency Identification, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 301, 323

(2005).
116. For this and additional criticism on self-regulation see Campbell, supra note 112, at
717-19.
117. The incoherent practices taken by the different companies and institutions managing
bio-repositories is evident from Table I infra section III.C.3. See also EISEMAN ET AL., supra
note 41.
118. Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens, Report of the Secretary's Advisory
Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems (1973),
http://wwvw.epic.org/privacy/hew 1973report (last visited Nov. 2006).
119. OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal
Data (1980),
http://www.oecd.org/document/I8/0,2340,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1

1 00.htnil
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enforcement.12 These as well as some of the more specific issues
pertaining to genetic information and genetic privacy, such as
21
questions of ownership and transferability of genetic information,
are insufficiently addressed at the present time and require further
consideration.
1.

Property Rights in Genetic Information

With the growing understanding of the human genome, genetic
information may reveal great amounts of sensitive personal
information and subsequent questions of handling and using genetic
information emerge. 22 Because of this, protection for genetic
information is needed to safeguard one's privacy interests, autonomy,
and dignity. One question that arises is should the law recognize
property rights to one's genetic information in order to enhance the
protection granted to it, or does the right to privacy provide sufficient
protection?
The famous court decision in the case of Moore v. Regents of the
University of California123 did not recognize the existence of a
patient's property rights to bodily parts removed from the patient's
body. 124 Moore was treated at the Medical Center of the University of
California at Los Angeles for hairy-cell leukemia. 125 In the course of
treatment Moore's spleen was removed and was later used by the
treating physician to establish a cell-line derived from Moore's Tlymphocytes. 26 The University patented this cell line, which had
promising research uses. 127 Moore claimed to have property interests
in his removed spleen and hence also in the patented cell line. 28 The
majority opinion, rejecting Moore's conversion claim, explained that
granting such property interests to the individual would unnecessarily
hinder medical research, and thus harm society as a whole. 29 One's
(last visited Nov. 2006) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines].
120. See Eschet, supra note 115, at 324-25.
121.
The question of transfer of sensitive medical information to insurance companies and
employers is covered by the HIPPA regulations, and is forbidden under it, but the regulations do
not address the question of transfer of medical and genetic data to a third party that is neither an
employer nor an insurance company.
122.
Sindor, supra note 53.
123.

Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).

124.

Id.at493.

125.
126.
127.

Id at480.
Id.at481.
Id. at 481-82. This cell line is known as the "Mo" cell line.

128.

Id.

129.

Id. at 493-94.
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privacy and autonomy interests, the majority stated, can be
sufficiently protected via fiduciary duty and informed consent and
thus there is no need to resort to property rights that would inflict
additional costs on society. 130 In contrast, in dissenting opinions,
Judge Mosk argued that recognizing ownership interests in tissues
"would give patients an affirmative right of participation,"''
and
patient's
a
protects
Judge Brousard added that the law of conversion
32
right to control the future use of his organs.
Is genetic information different from body parts? Should an
individual have the ability to protect her genetic information via
property rights? It could be claimed that each individual's DNA is
unique and belongs to the person from whom it was derived, thus
recognizing ownership rights in genetic information.' 33 However, a
similar claim made by Moore with regard to his spleen was rejected
by the Majority opinion, concluding that a person does not have
property interests in her removed body parts. 134 It could also be
argued that since the United States Patent and Trademark Office
35
(PTO) recognized gene sequences as patentable subject matter,1 thus
36
fragments,'
DNA
human
over
granting researchers property rights
there is no restriction to grant such rights to individuals.' 31 In fact,
five states: Alaska,' 38 Colorado, 139 Florida, 140 Georgia, 14 1 and

130.

Id.

131.

Id. at 520 (Mosk, J., dissenting).

132.
133.

Id. at 502 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
Allen, supra note 15, at 49-51.

134.

Moore, 793 P.2d at 488-97.

135. Patents on gene sequences are granted as long as they show "specific and substantial
utility that is credible." See ANDREWS, MEHLMAN, & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 1,at 162-63.
136. For further discussion on the patenting of genes see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ReExamining the Role of Patents in Appropriatingthe Value of DNA Sequences, 49 EMORY L.J.

783 (2000); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S.Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCi. 698 (1998); Melissa L. Sturges, Who Should
Hold Property Rights to the Human Genome? An Application of the Common Heritage of
Humankind, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 219 (1997).

137. It should be made clear that patent rights over cells and DNA fragments are given
over their isolated and purified form that is arguably different from the original form in which
they exist in the body.
138. "[A] DNA sample and the results of a DNA analysis performed on the sample are the
exclusive property of the person sampled or analyzed." ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010(a)(2)
(2004). Alaska is currently the only state that extends its personal property protection to DNA
samples.
139. "Genetic information is the unique property of the individual to whom the
information pertains." COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7(l)(a) (2005).
140. "DNA analysis may be performed only with the informed consent of the person to be
tested, and the results of such DNA analysis, whether held by a public or private entity, are the
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Louisiana 142 have already defined genetic information as personal
property. However, applying the majority's opinion in Moore to this
debate seems to reject granting property interests in genetic
information to the individual to whom the information pertains.
Indeed, two U.S. courts have since restated the rational behind the
majority's decision in Moore and applied it to genetic research.
The District Court of Florida in Greenberg v. Miami Children's
Hospital Research Institutet43 refused to grant ownership rights in
body tissues and genetic information to the donors of said tissues. The
plaintiffs, parents of children with Canavan disease, 144 contributed
tissue samples for the research of the disease and subsequently sought
ownership rights on the Canavan gene that was found in the course of
the research. 45 The court denied the plaintiffs' conversion claim and
declined to find property interests in the donated tissues and genetic
information derived thereof. 146 The court reasoned that granting the
donors such ownership rights "would bestow a continuing right for
donors to possess the results of any research conducted by the
hospital"''

47

thus crippling medical research. 148 Similarly, the District

exclusive property of the person tested, are confidential, and may not be disclosed without the
consent of the person tested." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40(2)(a) (2005).
141.
"Genetic information is the unique property of the individual tested." GA. CODE ANN.
§ 33-54-1(1) (2005).
142.
"An insured's or enrollee's genetic information is the property of the insured or
enrollee." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.7(E) (2004).
143.
Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst. Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D.
Fla. 2003).
144.
The Canavan disease is a fatal genetic disorder that usually causes the death of the
child by the age of four. It is inherited as an autosomal recessive trait. See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canavandisease (last visited Nov. 2006).
145.
This case may be distinguished from Moore since the plaintiffs sought proprietary
rights in the research discoveries in order to make them widely available to the public at no cost,
whereas the physicians sought patent protection for isolating the Canavan gene thus restricting
access to it. Greeberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1067. Moreover, according to the facts presented in
the case, the plaintiffs took an active part in locating and contacting Canavan families,
convincing them to donate tissue samples, compiling their medical data, and creating the
registry that enabled the research. Id. It would have therefore been possible to recognize the
plaintiffs as co-contributors to the research and thus co-owners of the resulting discoveries.
Another key difference between this case and the Moore case pertains to the informed consent
obligation. The majority in the Moore decision found that the physician breached his fiduciary
duty toward Moore and that the informed consent tool is sufficient to protect one's privacy and
autonomy interests, thus finding no need to resolve to a conversion claim. See Moore v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). The Greenbergcourt, however, refused to extend
the duty of obtaining informed consent to medical researchers, although a close relationship
existed between the physician and the donors. Greenberg,264 F. Supp. 2d at 1069-1070.
146.

Greenberg,264 F. Supp. 2d at 1074.

147.

Id. at 1076.

148.

1d.
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Court of Missouri held in Washington University v. Catalona 49 that

the ownership rights in biological materials (including tissues, blood,
and DNA samples) voluntarily contributed to the GU Biorepository
for the purpose of prostate cancer research vest with Washington
University and not with the donors of the tissues. 150 All three courts
found the research participants to be "donors" that15 1hence parted from
their ownership rights in their biological material.
Arguments for not granting ownership rights in genetic
information embed moral as well as economic rationales. 152 First,
granting an individual property rights over genetic information could
impede genetic research by increasing the transaction costs of
obtaining access to genetic material and information, which is a
growing part of today's medical research. 15 3 Second, it has been
claimed that treating genetic information as a commodity, i.e.,
granting property rights in the individual, disregards personhood
154
values and interests in the self, rather than enhancing its protection.
Third, property rights do not seem to be adequate protection for
of
personal information, primarily because unlike other types 155
property, we wish personal information to be free of alienability.
Privacy concerns should allow the individual to prohibit the retransfer
of their personal information from the primary holder to a third party,
and put the individual in a position to bind the new recipient with the
149.

Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985 (E.D. Mo. 2006). The suit was brought

following the departure of Catalona, the physician that led the prostate cancer research in
Washington University, from Washington University to Northwestern University. Catalona
attempted to transfer the biological material collected in the GU Biorepository with him and for
this purpose wrote to his patients asking them to instruct the transfer of their biological material
to his possession. Id.
150. The reasoning given by the court was that at all times Washington University housed
said materials, funded the research, and claimed ownership in its informed consent forms and
Material Transfer Agreements. Id. at 989. Claims regarding the ownership rights of Catalona
himself, the principal investigator of the research, were dropped. Id. at 994 n. 11.
151. Id. at997.
152.

See Radhika Rao, Property,Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U.L. REV. 359, 436

(2000) ("[W]e should adopt the language of privacy rather than that of property when we seek to
protect self-ownership without suggesting that rights in the human body can be conveyed to
others and when we wish to distinguish gifts of the body to family members from sales to
strangers."). See also Sonia M. Suter, DisentanglingPrivacy from Property: Toward a Deeper
Understandingof Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737 (2004); Allen, supra note 15.
See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990); Heller &
153.
Eisenberg, supra note 136.
154.
Suter, supra note 152, at 745-47; Allen, supra note 15, at 49-51.
155.
See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125,
1137-38 (2000); Suter, supra note 152, at 800-01. For more on inalienable rights see TERRANCE
MCCONNELL, INALIENABLE RIGHTS: THE LIMITS OF CONSENT IN MEDICINE AND THE LAW
(2000).
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same constraints that applied to the original holder of the
information. 156 Traditional property protection is therefore
inadequate
157
for protecting personal data such as genetic information.
In order to achieve the same degree of protection that property
law grants to personal property, the existing privacy protection for
personal genetic information must be enhanced. Absent meaningful
privacy protection measures and constraints on the assembly, use, and
transfer of genetic information and material, an individual lacks
meaningful control and decisional power over her own personal
genetic information and its subsequent uses.
Put differently, if property rights in bodily tissues and genetic
information are to be avoided, for moral and economic reasons as
well as for the benefit of scientific research and the common good,
there is a need to strengthen the privacy protection mechanisms
currently available for genetic information and genetic material. If the
industry does not want to hinder its own research and scientific
advancements by pushing the public into a property rights regime in
genetic material, a phenomenon that can already be viewed in some
states,1 58 it should adopt fair information practices that would
effectively safeguard the privacy and autonomy of the people whose
genetic information it collects.1 59 Additional aspects of genetic
information collections, such as the sensitivity, security,
transferability and access to the information intensify the need for fair
information practices for the standardized regulation of genetic
databases and biobanks.

156. See Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and PersonalData, supra note 17, at 2090-2 100
(advocating for a "hybrid inalienability" model that permits individuals to trade their personal
information while placing limitations on its future uses, rather than viewing property rights as
automatically entailing free alienability).
157. Samuelson, supra note 155, at 1138-39. See also Mark A. Lemley, Private Property,
52 STAN. L. REv. 1545, 1554 (arguing against intellectual property rights for personal
information: "If we want privacy, we must be willing to accept the fact that there is no good
'market solution' and endorse some government regulation of the behavior of data collectors.
For the reasons I have suggested, I think granting property rights in data to individuals is not a
plausible solution. In particular, it is not a 'free market' solution, because we cannot expect the
market to allocate those billions of rights efficiently.") For a somewhat different view see
Schwartz, Property,Privacy, and PersonalData,supra note 17, at 2090-2100.
158. See supra notes 138-142.
159. Campbell, supra note 112, at 715 (noting that "often times, an industry will engage in
self-regulation in an attempt to stave off government regulation.").
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2.

Sensitivity

The sensitivity of genetic information has different levels and
degrees. Generally, the more sensitive the information, the greater
protection it requires.160 For example, the color of one's eyes falls
under the definition of personal genetic information,16 1 but it is not as
sensitive as genetic information of a medical nature such as that
regarding a predisposition for certain diseases like breast cancer or
Alzheimer's.162 While the latter, if learned, may be the cause for
insurance and even employment discrimination, the former is unlikely
to cause the same effect; hence the difference in sensitivity in this
example is evident.
Another important attribute to the sensitivity of the information
depends on whether the information may be linked to an identifiable
person. The European Union Directive on Data protection defines
"personal data" as: "any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an identifiable person is
one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by
reference to an identification number or to one or more factors
specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or
social identity.' 63 Similarly, the OECD privacy guidelines define
personal data as "any information ' 64relating to an identified or
identifiable individual (data subject)."'
Because genetic information has various degrees of sensitivity,
based largely on whether or not the information is identifiable, it is
useful to distinguish between genetic information collected for
clinical purposes and information collected for research purposes. In
the clinical context, such as genetic testing, the likelihood that the
genetic information will be easily identifiable is higher than in the
research context. 165 Genetic information collected for the purpose of
160.

Gostin, supra note 29, at 519-21; U.K. Human Genetics Commission, supra note 33,

at 4-6, 10-11.

161.
The U.K. Human Genetics Commission defines personal genetic information as: "any
information about the genetic make-up of an identifiable person, whether it comes from DNA
testing or from any other source (including the details of a person's family history)." U.K.
Human Genetics Commission, supranote 33, at 5.
162. Id.at 4-5.
163. The Data Protection Directive of 1995, art. 2,
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/legal/en/dataprot/directiv/directiv.html.
164. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 119.
165. McEwen, supra note 3, at 240-42; Sindor, supra note 53, at 34 (stating that "[i]n
clinical practice it is often difficult to separate the therapeutic and research use of tissues and the
related health data information. Therefore, in some countries, there is an explicit prohibition on
using data that had been collected for the purpose of diagnosis and therapy for research
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clinical tests will usually be directly linked to additional identifiable
information such as name, address, birth date, diagnosis, and family
diagnose, locate, and provide proper
history in order to better
166
treatment to the patient.
On the other hand, if the genetic information is being collected
primarily for research purposes then it will usually not be directly
linked to any identifiable data, and therefore, theoretically at least,
will pose a lesser risk to the privacy of the individual.167 Nonetheless,
at times it remains possible to link this information to a specific
person if enough DNA sequences are available due to the "unique
quality" of the DNA.168 Moreover, often times the option to link
genetic information, obtained for research purposes, to an identifiable
person will be retained by the research institutions, so as to have the
ability to contact the person in the event a genetic disorder is
69
discovered, or in case further medical information is needed.'
Linkage to medical records may also reveal indirect identifiable
information as well as certain demographic data. 170 Hence, privacy
protection measures must apply not only to information that is
directly identifiable, but that also has the potential to be identified.
The HIPAA regulations, previously mentioned, apply only to
identifiable information.' 7' As a result, de-identified genetic data
available in private bio-repositories is not subject to the HIPAA
regulations and their privacy requirements as long as it is in its deidentified form. 7 2 A number of private bio-repositories have
implemented HIPPA requirements, despite claiming that they are not
obliged to do so, and it has been found that others even implemented
more stringent practices than those required under HIPPA. 73 This
trend may indicate a market preference for more safeguards than
currently mandated, safeguards that can be more consistently
achieved via formulation of fair information practices. Adopting clear

purposes.").
166. McEwen, supra note 3, at 240-42.
167. Id.
168. See Murray, supra note 24, at 63; Gostin, supra note 29, at 504.
169. The U.K. Biobank, for example, gives the participants the option to choose whether
or not they want to be informed in such event. See U.K. Human Genetics Commission, supra
note 33, at 17.
170. Rothstein, supra note 107, at 90.
171. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(2).
172. Itshould be noted that once the information is re-identified, it becomes subject to the
regulations again. Id.
EISEMAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 130-32.
173.

GENETIC DATABASES AND BIOBANKS

2006]

guidelines is also likely to enhance public trust and
increase
174
individuals' willingness to take part in research projects.
3.

Access and Security

As part of their services, commercial bio-repositories frequently
offer pharmaceutical companies and research institutions access to
their private bio-libraries. This is necessary to the advancement of
research and might remind some of traditional collaborative sciences,
or it might be perceived as a new form of open-source access to
biotechnology. 75 Nonetheless, this requires extra caution in order to
protect the personal privacy of the data subjects, especially when such
access is offered online. It is important to have guidelines as to who
may have access, and to what types of information. Third parties that
are given permission to research the information stored in biobanks or
genetic databases should only have access to unidentifiable
information that cannot be re-identified unless the individual gave
prior consent for allowing access to identifiable information.
Specific guidelines as to when and by whom encrypted data may
be de-encrypted should be formed. All employees with access to
sensitive data should be required to adhere to confidentiality
agreements or policies. 176 Only a restricted number of personnel
should have access to identifiable information and to the linking key
between the anonymized genetic information and the person to whom
it pertains. There should also be limitations on the uses of this
information, so as to ensure that the information is being used for the
research purposes agreed to by the research subject rather than for
unwarranted uses.
In addition, and of no less importance, genetic databanks and
bio-repositories must be secured from unauthorized access (both in
the physical as well as in the virtual worlds). 177 As Table 1 indicates,
there is currently no single uniform standard for the protection of
sensitive genetic information. For instance, while some companies
174. See also Rothstein, supra note 107, at 94-95. On the importance of public trust in
biomedical research, see Sue Weldon, 'PublicConsent' or 'Scientific Citizenship'? What Counts
as Public Participation in Population-basedDNA Collections?, in GENETIC DATABASES:
SoCIo-ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE COLLECTION AND USE OF DNA 161 (Richard Tutton & Oonagh

Corrigan eds., 2004).
175. See also David W. Opderbeck, The Penguin's Genome, or Coase and Open Source
Biotechnology, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 167 (2004).
176. U.K. Human Genetics Commission, supra note 33, at 18.
177. See Recommendations of the European Society of Human Genetics, supranote 39, at
S9 (calling for the "standardization of coding, sample tracking, computerization, and
encryption.").
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choose to encrypt the information they collect, others do not,
and
78
even encrypted information is potentially exposed to decoding. 1
Table 1: Tissue Repositories Security Measures

79

Number of

Searchable

Access

Encrypts

Has

Has

human
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to
quality

identifying
data

an
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SOPs
180
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board
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AFIP

18 1

92,000,000

X
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X
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X

X
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SPORE
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Pitt Tissue
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3,000
1,100

X

X

X

X

X

X

Partial

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

The existing variations in bio-repositories and lack of uniform
standards not only impede research by making it more difficult to
compare results from specimens taken from different banks, 86 but
also undermine the privacy interests of the research subjects. It is
therefore more difficult and costly for individuals to find out what

178. See the criticism voiced on the encryption mechanism adopted by the Icelandic
Health Sector Database Act. Infra notes 263-264 and accompanying text. Moreover, if sufficient
DNA sequence data is stored in the genealogical database, it is theoretically possible to identify
the individual whose sequence it is, even if her name or other identifiable information is
removed. See Murray, supra note 24, at 63; Gostin, supra note 29, at 504.
179. See bio-itworld.com, Tissue Repositories, March 17, 2004,
http://www.bio-itwotld.com/archive/031704/blood-sidebar_4641 .html.
180.
Requires the use of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for tissue collection.
181. See Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, National Pathology Repository,
http://www.afip.org/Departments/repository/npr.html
182. See Genomic Collaborative, Inc., http://www.genomicsinc.com/.
183. See National Institute of Cancer, Cooperative Human Tissue Network (CHTN),
http://www-chtn.ims.nci.nih.gov/.
184. See Mayo Clinic, Prostrate Center SPORE Grant,
http://cancercenter.mayo.edu/mayo/research/prostateprogram/spore prostate.cfm.
185. University of Pittsburgh Health Sciences Tissue Bank.
186. EISEMAN ET AL., supra note 41; Mark D. Uehling, Study: FederalBanks areLagging,
Bio-IT, http://www.bio-itworld.com/archive/031704/bloodsidebar_4640.html (last visited Nov.
2006).
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measures are taken by each institute, and which measures would
provide adequate privacy protection. In other words, the diversity in
security measures taken by different institutions impose additional
transaction costs on data subjects who care for their privacy, thus
making it more difficult for pure market forces to direct the industry
toward more stringent privacy protections.' 87
Appropriate security measures should not only restrict external
access to the information by hackers, but also the number of internal
personnel that have access to personal information, particularly to
identifiable or potentially identifiable information. 88 Data retrieved
from the linkage of personal information and genetic information as
well as any data that has a greater potential of being identifiable
should be subject to the highest form of security measures, including
data encryption, with access limited to restricted personnel on a needto-know basis.
4.

Transferability

For commercial biotech companies, their databases that contain
genetic information are some of their most valuable assets. One major
concern is that absent proper restrictions, companies will treat genetic
databases and biobanks as they would treat any other commercial
asset, disregarding their sensitive nature. For instance, a company
might sell its database in case of financial difficulty, or simply for the
sake of making
profit, just as it might do with any other valuable asset
189
it possesses.

A similar concern exists with regard to personal user information
collected, for example, by online retailers. 190 This information, which
includes the purchasing habits, billing information, and similar
profiles of consumers, is subject to transfer of ownership in the event
of a retailer's bankruptcy or other financial problems.' 9 1 But while the
187.
Under a market approach it is assumed that consumers would prefer to do business
with those companies that better protect their privacy. See Eschet, supra note 115, at 321.
188.

EISEMAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 121-26, 135.

189.
For additional examples of the commodification of personal information in the
technology age see Schwartz, Property,Privacy, and PersonalData,supra note 17, at 2060-69,
2127-28. For a more general discussion of this trend see THE COMMODIFICATION OF
INFORMATION (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil W. Netanel eds., 2002).
190.

See SOLOVE, supra note 21, at 83.

191.

See In re Toysmart.com, LLC, No. 00-13995-CJK (Bankr. E.D. Mass. 2000) (order

concluding that Toysmart could sell its consumers' personal information database despite its
privacy policy which stated that "personal information voluntarily submitted by visitors to our
site, such as name, address, billing information and shopping preferences, is never shared with a
third party" (emphasis added)).
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privacy policies of such dot-corn companies often address the
question of transfer of sensitive information to third parties, 92 many
genetic database and biobank companies fail to specifically address
these concerns. For example, DNAPrint Genomics, which provides an
193
array of genetic services from paternity tests to private forensics,
fails to specifically address this scenario in its Code of Ethics. 194 In
the absence of a Federal law prohibiting the sale of personal genetic
information and in view of previous court decisions allowing the
transfer of personal information from one entity to another, 195 the
unrestricted sale or transfer of genetic information to a third party
seems like a realistic probability. State laws also largely fail to
address this scenario, thus creating a loophole leading to potential
breaches of individuals' privacy and autonomy.
The issue of treating genetic databases as commercial assets
raises several difficult problems. First, genetic databases contain
highly sensitive information which, in some cases, can be directly
linked to specific individuals whether those individuals chose to be
part of the database (as in the case of voluntary genetic testing) or not
(as in the case of forensic databases). Second, the ownership status of
companies collecting genetic information is unclear as is the question
of whether any ethical restrictions accompany such information. 196
Thus it is disputed whether the company is free to sell or transfer such
information without restriction. It has been suggested by scholars that
the holders of medical data should be considered as mere "trustees,"
not owners, of the data; a position that places greater restrictions and
responsibilities over the authorized uses of the data and puts
limitations on future disclosure while empowering individuals.1 97 At
192. For example, the privacy policy of Amazon.com specifically stipulates that "in the
unlikely event that Amazon.com, Inc., or substantially all of its assets are acquired, customer
information will of course be one of the transferred assets." Amazon.com Privacy Notice,
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/browse/-/468496/102-0508312-4688103
(last visited
Nov. 2006).
193. DNAPrint Genomics Home Page, http://www.dnaprint.com/index.html (last visited
Nov. 2006).
194. See DNAPrint Genomics, Code of Business Conduct and Ethics,
http://www.dnaprint.com/welcome/corporate/ethics/ (last visited Nov. 2006).
195. See In re Toysmart.com, LLC, No. 00-13995-CJK (Bankr. E.D. Mass. 2000).
196. See generally SOLOVE, supra note 21, at 78-79.
197. For more on holders of health information as "trustees" see Schwartz, Economics of
Personal Health Care Information, supra note 20, at 57-59. See also Winickoff & Winickoff,
supra note 41, at 1182-83 (advocating for a charitable trust model for genomic biobanks in order
to, among other things, insure "longevity" and prevent the transfer of genetic material without
the prior informed consent of the tissue donor); Kaye, supra note 37, at 133-34; SOLOVE, supra
note 21, at 102-04 (suggesting that companies that collect and store personal information stand
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the very least, the individuals to whom the information pertains
should be able to place limitations on future uses of their genetic
information in order to maintain their autonomy interests, particularly
when identifiable information is at stake. 198 However, the Missouri
District Court in the above-mentioned Catalona case refused to
acknowledge the custodian nature of biorepositories for fear it will
hinder research:
Medical research can only advance if access to these materials to
the scientific community is not thwarted by private agendas. If left
unregulated and to the whims of a RP [Research Participant], these
highly-prized biological materials would become nothing more
than chattel going to the highest bidder. It would no longer be a
question of the importance of the research protocol to public
health, but rather who can pay the most. Selling excised tissue or
DNA on E-Bay would become as commonplace as selling your old
television on E-Bay. The integrity and utility of all biorepositories
would be seriously threatened if RPs could move their samples
from institution to institution any time they wanted. No longer
could research protocols rely on aggregate collections since
individual samples would come and go. Accountability would no
longer exist since99institutions would merely be warehouses filling
purchase orders. 1
The concern that important genetic information will become
nothing more than a commodity is the basis for a trustee system,
which limits the ability of the keepers of the information to trade it. In
the words of Jane Kaye: "A trust keeps this information as a resource
for the country rather than being bought and sold subject to market
forces. It also means that ownership is retained by the individuals who
have donated information, which would at the same time respect and
acknowledge their distribution.,, 20 0 Hence, the recommendation of the
European Society of Human Genetics to recognize the data subject as
the controller of the information as long as the data is identifiable, and
to consider the researcher as the custodian of the information, whether
anonymous or not (while allowing the researcher to maintain the

in a fiduciary relationship with the individuals to whom the information pertains);
Recommendations of the European Society of Human Genetics, supra note 39, at SIO
(recommending that while third parties should be able to use information collected and stored in
genetic databases and biobanks, transfer of ownership should not occur).
198. See Schwartz, Property,Privacy, and PersonalData,supra note 17, at 2094-2100.
199. Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 1002 (E.D. Mo. 2006).
200. Kaye, supra note 37, at 134.
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intellectual property rights arising from the research), seems highly
appropriate.2 ° '
Another potential problem is the ease with which sensitive
information may travel national borders. Absent specific restrictions,
genetic information may be sold and transferred to companies located
outside of the United States.20 2 Ironically, it is likely that the personal
information transferred to European countries for example, is actually
better protected because of the stronger privacy protections granted in
the E.U. for such information compared to the United States.20 3
However, absent legal restrictions on the transfer of genetic
information abroad, such information could potentially be transferred
to countries that offer a lesser level of privacy protection compared to
that available in the United States or even to countries with no privacy
protection at all, a situation that should not be permitted.
It may be argued that transfer of ownership in genetic databases
and biobanks does not necessarily affect the privacy interests of
individuals, particularly if the transferred information is coded, or that
market powers alone are sufficient to safeguard privacy interests.
However, these contentions are not reassuring for a variety of reasons.
First, changes in ownership may make it more difficult for a data
subject to control future uses of her information and increases the
possibility that the information may be used for purposes others than
those originally agreed to. Second, as previously explained, pure
market forces are unlikely to provide adequate remedy because of
market failures, such as the high transaction costs that may prevent
consumers from choosing only those companies that implement
strong privacy protections.20 4 Moreover, in the computerized world in
which we live, personalized data can easily and cheaply be
transmitted from one country to the other. Absent any meaningful
regulation these transfers could further undermine personal privacy.
This scenario is especially plausible when private, commercial
companies, which seek to maximize their profits, control the data.
Lastly, the same type of alienability argumentation that sees personal
201.
Recommendations of the European Society of Human genetics, supra note 39,
sections 27(a)-(b), at S9.
202. For example, at the end of March 2005 Ardais Corporation and Cytomyx Holdings
plc, a life science company based in the United Kingdom, announced their newly formed
collaboration. Under the Collaboration, Cytomyx acquired and gained control over an Ardais
biorepository containing over 130,000 samples. See Cytomyx Holdings, PLC,
http://www.cytomyx-holdings.com/files/Ardais%2OAcquisition.pdf (last visited Nov. 2006).
203. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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information as different from other types of property applies here.2 °5
If personal information should be free of alienability, then the data
subjects should be able to prohibit the transfer of their personally
identifiable information to third parties.
For related reasons and in order to protect privacy interests, the
European Union permits the transfer of personal information only to
nations that grant sufficient privacy protection measures.20 6 Similarly,
the Icelandic parliament, which granted deCode, a private American
company, access to all of the nation's medical records, insisted that
the database be located in Iceland, and that all processing of the data
be done in Iceland.20 7 Such limitations are largely absent in the United
States, especially when dealing with restrictions on private
companies. 208 As a result, research subjects lack control over and
often fail to receive further assurances regarding the potential uses of
their personal information. Hence, limitations on the transfer of
genetic information including restrictions on the information's
location, the receiving entity, and future usages are required.20 9
In sum, there is a need for increased scrutiny when it comes to
private, commercial bio-repositories. This could be achieved through
the establishment of fair information practices. At the same time,
more supervision should be directed at partnership initiatives between
state entities and private commercial companies and the flow of
information from the public to the private sector. The following
section will analyze the privacy threats posed by these new
partnerships using the Icelandic Health Sector Database as a case
study.

205.

See supra note 155.

206.

See the European Data Protection Directive of 1995, article 25.

207.

See HSD Act, supra note 11.

208.

For additional discussion of the differences between the European and the American

approaches see Schwartz, European Data Protection Law, supra note 110, at 393-98; Joel R.
Reidenberg, The E. U Data Protection Directive: Implicationsfor the U.S. Privacy Debate,

March 8, 2001,
http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/hearings/03082001 Hearing49/ReidenbergIO4.htm;
Joel R. Reidenberg, E-commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 717 (2001)
[hereinafter Reidenberg, Trans-AtlanticPrivacy].
209.
See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, The Political Control of Biotechnology, in OUR
POSTHUMAN FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 181, 181-94

(2002) (stressing the need for regulation, particularly international regulation, to control
biotechnological advances).
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IV. PRIVATE - PUBLIC PARTNERSHIPS IN THE GENETIC
ERA
There is an extensive debate about whether private or
governmental control over personal data is more intrusive, and which
requires more precautions. Traditionally, Americans are more wary of
government action,2 1° while their European counterparts put more
faith in their government and less trust in private industries. As a
result, Americans place greater restrictions on their government than
on private industry. 2 11 However, as recently suggested by legal
scholars Michael Birnhack and Niva Elkin-Koren, we must now also
be conscious of a new player, a partnership between the two entities,
referred to as the "Invisible Handshake" between governments and
private industry.2 12 The following section will analyze the Icelandic
Health Sector Database as an example of a private-public partnership

210.
See, e.g., Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother's Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and
Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Datafor Law Enforcement, 29
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 595 (2004). Hoofnagle states:
Our nation also has a deep suspicion of government action and motives, while
maintaining trust in the action of the private sector ....
[Libertarians and
conservatives] have argued that government collection, use, and disclosure of
information presents more risk than commercial collection because the
government has the power to arrest, imprison, and even to execute citizens.
Commercial entities, although they hold our mortgages and often control our
employment, arguably present less risk to our autonomy.
Id. at 629-30.
211.
See Reidenberg, Trans-AtlanticPrivacy,supra note 208.
[T]he United States has, in recent years, left the protection of privacy to markets
rather than law. In contrast, Europe treats privacy as a political imperative
anchored in fundamental human rights.... This vision of governance generally
regards the state as the necessary player to frame the social community in which
individuals develop and in which information practices must serve individual
identity.... Indeed, citizens trust government more than the private sector with
personal information.
Id. at 730-31.
212.
Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible Handshake: The
Reemergence of the State in the Digital Environment, 8 VA, J.L. & TECH. 6 (2003) ("Whether
the Big Brother we distrust is government and its agencies, or multinational corporations, the
emerging collaboration between the two in the online environment produces the ultimate
threat."). Birnhack & Elkin-Koren point to the rise of the Invisible Handshake between the
government and the private industry in the Information Technology realm, primarily the
growing use by the government of the tools developed by the industry for its own commercial
and legal needs. Id. See also Hoofnagle, supra note 210, at 630 (arguing that the "distinction
between the risks of government and commercial privacy risk is no longer tenable. Commercial
actors provide personal information to the government in a number of contexts, and often with
astonishing alacrity."). In the genetic context the information flow between the private and
public sectors occurs mainly in the direction of the private sector from the public sector, in
return for financial compensation. See Petersen, supra note 10 and accompanying text.

2006]

GENETIC DATABASES AND BIOBANKS

in the genetic realm, and will examine the costs and benefits of
having such partnerships. The Icelandic commercial model will then
be compared to the charitable approach adopted by U.K. Biobank.
Implications for the U.S. will thereafter be drawn from the two
experiences and a set of fair information principles specifically
designed to the genetic landscape will be suggested.
A.

The Icelandic Health Sector Database

The Icelandic Health Sector Database Act, under which the
Icelandic government granted a private, for-profit, American
company access to all of Iceland's medical files, along with a license
to compile them all into one digital database linked to genetic
information collected, is a good (some would say alarming) example
of such partnerships between the private and public sectors in the
context of genetic privacy. Despite the fact that, to this date, this
comprehensive database has not yet materialized, and probably never
will,2

13

much can be learned from the Icelandic experience.

1.

The Icelandic Health Sector Database Act

The Icelandic Act on a Health Sector Database 2 14 (the "HSD
Act"), enacted December 1998, attracted much attention as well as
criticism since it was first introduced in 1997.215 The Act established
the Icelandic Health Sector Database on an opt-out basis, 2 16 and its
goal was to "authorize the creation and operation of a centralized
database of non-personally identifiable health data with the aim of
increasing knowledge in order to improve health and health
services.' 217 The creation of the database and the genealogical
research it would allow was believed to be especially beneficial. In
this regard, the Icelandic population was viewed as a particularly
good case study because of its genetically homogenous nature, which
was believed to make it relatively easier to spot genetic variations
associated with diseases.2 18
213.

For a review of the HSD Act and its demise see Winickoff, supra note 11.

214.

HSD Act, supra note II.

215.

Winickoff, supra note 11, at 89-91.

216.

HSD Act, supra note 11, art. 8.

217.

HSDAct, supranote ll, art. 1.

218.
The validity of this argument is somewhat questionable because humans share 99.9%
of the genome and most genotype variation is found within races or ethnic groups, not between
them. See Henry T. Greely, Iceland's Planfor Genomics Research: Facts and Implications, 40
JURIMETRICS J. 153, 159-61 (2000) (listing six additional benefits for conducting this type of
research in Iceland: 1) Iceland's relatively small size; 2) the general support granted by the
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The Act granted deCode, a private commercial American
company, an exclusive 12-year license to construct and manage an
electronic database for all health records available in the Icelandic
national health care system, namely the health records of close to
300,000 citizens, as well as records dating back to the first half of the
20 h century. 2 19 Reportedly, the Health Sector Database Bill was
drafted on the basis of a proposal made by deCode itself.220 The Bill

was criticized on numerous counts, including that it lacked provisions
for obtaining informed consent of individuals whose information was
included in the database, undermined scientific freedom, restrained
competition, eroded the doctor-patient confidential relationship, and
invaded individuals' right to privacy. 22' Nonetheless, in December
1998, the Althingi, the Icelandic parliament, enacted the bill shortly
after it was first introduced.222
The database was to include information on children, deceased
persons, and incompetent individuals, none of which can legally
provide informed consent to the use of their personal information.2 23
This electronic database was designed to contain extensive medical
information including: records on individuals' health, medical
treatments, lifestyles, social circumstances, employment, and
family.2 24 deCode was further authorized to link this health
information to two additional databases: Iceland's genealogy database
and another genetic database consisting of collections from volunteers
from within the Icelandic population.2 25
Icelandic people to medical research; 3) an organized national health coverage that collected
th
information and tissue samples since the first half of the 20 century; 4) the obsession the
Icelandic people have with genealogy; 5) the fact that all Icelandic people experience relatively
similar environments; and 6) the existence of a political will to allow large scale genetic

research).
219. Id.
220. Ragnar Adalsteinsson, The Constitutionality of the Icelandic Act on a Health Sector
Database, in SOCIETY AND GENETIC INFORMATION: CODES AND LAWS IN THE GENETIC ERA

203, 203-04 (Judit SAndor ed., 2003). Due to numerous criticisms the Bill was substantially
amended from the original draft. One of the new provisions added was the opt-out option. Id. at
204. For a list of additional changes made from the first to the second draft of the HSD Act see
Greely, supra note 218, at 170-71.
221. Adalsteinsson, supra note 220, at 204-05.
222. Id. at 204.
223. Id at 206-07.
224. Gubmundsdottir v. Iceland, No. 151/2003 at part IV (Nov. 27, 2003) (Ice.), available
at http://www.mannvemd.is/english/lawsuits/Icelandic_SupremeCourtVerdict_151 2003.pdf
(court-authorized English translation Mar. 30, 2004).
225. See HSD Act, supra note 11, art. 10; Winickoff, supranote 16; Kaiser, supra note 8.
According to the Biobanks Act of 2001, any patient whose biological sample has been taken is
presumed to have consented to the storage of the sample in a biobank for the purpose of
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Put another way, the HSD Act granted deCode, a private
commercial company, presumed consent (or "blanket consent" 226) to
collect the medical records of the entirety of the Icelandic
population,2 27 compile them in one electronic database, and combine
this data with available genetic information, unless each individual
specifically8 indicated otherwise in a pre-defined six-month
window.

22

2.

Privacy Protection under the HSD Act

The HSD Act raises many concerns including the risk associated
with the commercialization of personal medical data, and the
intrusion upon medical privacy. 229 The fact that the Icelandic
government, which was entrusted with this sensitive information for
generations, was willing to transfer the population's medical records
to a private for-profit company without obtaining explicit individual
consent, is troubling. This is especially so since private commercial
companies are likely to have different motives and goals than a
national government. While the government is expected to act
primarily for the benefit of the public good, a for-profit company is
likely to act on its own economic interests, even when such interests
conflict with the public welfare. 230 To add insult to injury, it has been
determined by the Icelandic Supreme Court that the Act does not
grant adequate protection to the information it is to contain, as
required by the information's sensitive nature.2 3'

scientific research, unless the patient explicitly indicates otherwise. Adalsteinsson, supra note
220, at 208-09.
George J. Annas, Rules for Research on Human Genetic Variation - Lessons from
226.
Iceland, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1830-31 (2000); Jeffrey R. Gulcher & Kdri Stefdnsson, The
IcelandicHealthcareDatabaseand Informed Consent, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1827 (2000).
This implied priori consent to transfer medical information to the HSD database may
227.
be acceptable only if the information transferred is unidentified, and cannot be linked back to a
specific person. This issue was central to the Iceland Supreme Court's decision in
Guomundsd6ttir v. Iceland, No. 151/2003, supra note 224.
The HSD Act provided a six-month grace period beginning with the passage of the
228.
Act, in which people could choose to opt-out of the project. HSD Act, supra note 11, art. 8. See
also infra section IV.A.3.
Greely raises five main concerns stemming from the HSD Act: connection to a for229.
profit firm; lack of affirmative informed consent; privacy; exclusive control over the database;
and the financial terms of the agreement. Greely, supra note 218, at 176-91.
230. For a somewhat different view see Greely, supra note 218, at 176-78 (claiming that
there is no clear answer whether the government or non-profit institutions, such as universities,
are better suited to operate this type of databases).
Guomundsdottir v. Iceland, No. 151/2003, supra note 224.
231.
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It was suggested that the main benefit of the database created by
the HSD Act, was a boost to the country's economy.232 Backers
emphasized economic benefits such as suggesting the project would
bring back Icelandic scientists who left the country, and that it would
jump-start an Icelandic biotech industry.2 33 However, whether or not
the Icelandic parliament and the Icelandic people actually made a
good deal is questionable.2 34 Reportedly, the Icelandic government
could not meet the expenses of establishing such a comprehensive
database alone and therefore resorted to relying on a commercial
company to create and manage the database. But because of this,
should the database be revived in its original form and deliver on its
anticipated economic potential, the Icelandic government will receive
a surprisingly small share of the profits. 235 The justification for
transferring control of medical records from medical personnel to
administrative boards was that the medical records were not
considered individual property, but rather a national resource.23 6
However, even if the data is a national resource it is not clear why one
private (American) company should be the primary beneficiary,
instead of Icelandic institutions, companies, the government, and the
Icelandic people themselves.
On top of the problematic format in which deCode was
provisioned with the Icelandic public's records, The HSD Act did not
provide sufficient measures to safeguard information or privacy
interests in the database. The Act did not disregard the need for
safeguarding privacy. In fact, it purported to take several measures
aimed to protect the privacy interests of Icelandic citizens. Health
information and personal identification information was to be coded
prior to its entry to the database.237 Additionally, personal
identification data was designed to undergo one-way coding that, as
promised by the Act, cannot be traced by means of a decoder key.238

232.

See Adalsteinsson, supranote 220, at 205; Kaiser, supra note 8, at 1159.

233. See Adalsteinsson, supra note 220, at 205; Kaiser, supra note 8, at 1159.
234. See Greely, supra note 218, at 173 (stating that: "[t]he licensee's financial
obligations, as stipulated by the legislation, are not extensive.... The Act does not provide
Iceland with any royalty or other share of the licensee's profits, nor does it require the provision
of free drugs to Iceland that had been part of deCode's agreement with Roche."). Likewise,
granting deCode an exclusive license for a period of 12 years may in fact impede other Icelandic
research projects by denying access to the information contained in the database. Id. at 187;
Annas, supra note 226.
235.

Greely, supranote 218, at 187-91.

236.

Adalsteinsson, supra note 220, at 206.

237.

HSD Act, supra note 11, art. 7.

238.

HSD Act, supra note 11, art. 7. "One-way coding" is defined by the HSD Act as "the
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Furthermore, the process was to be overseen by two governmentally
appointed bodies: the Data Protection Committee, 239 and the
Committee on the Creation and Operation of a Health Service
Database. 240 These committees were to be responsible for monitoring
the recording and handling of personal information, making sure that
such data is adequately protected, and that the privacy interests of the
population are maintained.
But these provisions were not enough to safeguard the privacy
interests of the Icelandic population. For instance, One-way coding of
personally identifiable information is not plausible if the medical
records are linked to genealogical data. The reason is that in order to
successfully link this data, either deCode or one of the governmental
committees will need to have the decoding key, thus potentially
undermining the anonymity of the participants.24'
The HSD Act further authorized deCode to use the medical
information stored in the database for the company's "financial
profit" as long as the provisions of the Act and of the license were
followed,24 2 and allowed use of the stored information for the research
purposes of deCode's licensees.24 3 The Act did not require deCode to
receive informed consent from individuals whose information was in
the database before undertaking specific research projects, but rather
left the possible uses of the information unspecified,24 4 effectively
making it impossible for the participants in the project to have
meaningful control
over the uses of their own medical and genetic
245
information.

3.

Opting Out of the Health Sector Database

An Icelandic citizen who does not wish to be included in the
246
national healthcare database must actively opt-out of the project.
The people of Iceland were given a limited, pre-defined transitional

transformation of words or series of digits into an incomprehensible series of symbols that
cannot be traced by means of a decoding key." HSD Act, supra note 11, art. 3
239. HSD Act, supranote 11, art. 12.
240. HSD Act, supranote 11, arts. 10, 12.
241. See Greely, supra note 218, at 183-84.
242. "The licensee is authorized during the period of the license to use the data on the
database for purposes of financial profit, under the conditions laid down in this legislation and
the license." HSD Act, supra note 11, art. 10.
243. Winickoff, supra note 16, at 202.
244. HSD Act, supra note 11, art. 10.
245. Winickoff, supra note 16, at 202.
246. HSD Act, supra note 11, art. 8.
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period of six months after the passage of the HSD Act and prior to the
entry of medical data into the Health Sector Database to opt-out of the
project. 247 Only about 7%-10% of the Icelandic population opted-out
of the project, 24 8 which is a likely result of the requirement that

individuals actively opt-out of participation rather than allowing
individuals to voluntarily opt-in to the database. 249 An opt-in regime
would more accurately represent the true consent of the people and
better safeguard their autonomy and control over the information
collected.
Individuals who did not opt-out within the provided "grace
period" could, according to the Act, request at any time, that either all
of their existing or future medical information not be entered into the
database or that specific information not be entered. 251 However, the
HSD Act did not seem to allow for deletion of information once
entered into the database; rather, it only precluded entry of future
information.2 52
The HSD Act was also silent with regard to data collected from
legally incompetent individuals, including children and the mentally
disabled. Even though children's privacy protection has often been
regarded as requiring more rigorous regulations compared to that of
adults,253 the HSD Act chose not to address this segment of the
population, although they were intended to be included in the
database. 254 In addition, the HSD Act did not directly address the
247. Greely, supra note 218, at 172.
248. Kaiser, supra note 8, at 1159; Gulcher & Stefdnsson, supra note 226.
249. See Jeff Sovem, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options At All: The Fightfor Control
of PersonalInformation, 74 WASH. L. REv. 1033 (1999) (listing the benefits of an opt-in system
compared to an opt-out system).
250. Greely, supra note 218, at 180-81; SOLOVE, supra note 21, at 105-06. An opt-in
system was also the chosen framework in the later established U.K. Biobank, which
implemented
some of the critiques
of the Health Sector
Database. See
http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about/overview.php ("[The] UK Biobank is a long-term project...
[that will] gather information on the health and lifestyle of 500,000 volunteers").
251. HSD Act, supranote 11, art. 8.
252. See Greely, supra note 218, at 178-79; Winickoff, supra note 16, at 203; Annas,
supra note 226. Both Winickoff and Annas interpret the Act as making such removal of already
existing data in the database impossible.
253.
See, for example, the Child Online Protection Act of 1998 (COPA), 47 U.S.C. § 231
(2000), and the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2251 et seq.
(2000), both of which provide enhanced privacy protection for children in the online
environment.
254. The Act was interpreted to allow guardians of the incompetent or the parents of
children under 18 years of age to opt-out of the project on their behalf; in addition, once a child
reached the age of 18 she could independently opt-out of the project. But, just as the adults who
did not opt-out in the initial six-month grace period, this later act of opting-out once reaching
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rights of deceased persons pertaining to their health information. Put
differently, the Act did not address the rights of relatives to opt-out on
behalf of their deceased family members and to refuse the transfer of
the deceased's health information into the database. The latter issue
was subject to a lawsuit brought before the Icelandic Supreme
Court. 255 The plaintiff, a young woman who wanted to prevent the
transfer of her deceased father's medical records into the Health
Sector Database, brought suit after the Medical Director of Health of
Iceland refused to honor her opt-out request. 256 The refusal of the
Medical Director of Health was primarily based on the commentary
attached to the bill, which indicated that the Act was never intended
to enable people to prevent the transfer of information of their
deceased relatives.257
Although under Icelandic law, the personal rights of individuals
lapse on their death unless otherwise stipulated by law, 258 the
Supreme Court recognized that information regarding the deceased's
genetic history and records, may also apply to the appellant herself 259
The fact that genetic information may reveal medical information not
only pertaining to the subject herself but also to relatives was used to
argue that genetic information is different and more intrusive than
other forms of traditional medical information. 260 The Supreme Court
thus accepted the appellant's argument that her constitutional right to
privacy granted her an interest in preventing the transfer of her
deceased father's medical information to the Health Sector
Database.26 1
In its analysis of the HSD Act, the Icelandic Supreme Court
found additional flaws with the Act's protection mechanisms of
personal privacy; concluding that the one-way coding mechanism

legal adulthood concerned only future data, not data that had already been stored in the database.
The Medical Association of Iceland and deCode issued a joint statement on this issue, in which
they promised to erase already existing data from the database at a patient's request to opt-out.
Adalsteinsson, supra note 220, at 206-07.
255.

Guomundsd6ttir v. Iceland, No. 151/2003, supra note 224.

256.

Id. at Part I.

257.
258.

Id. at Part I; Adalsteinsson, supra note 220, at 207.
Gu6mundsd6ttir v. Iceland, No. 151/2003, supra note 224, at Part II.

259.

Id.

260.

See supranote 24 and accompanying text.

261.
Guomundsd6ttir v. Iceland, No. 151/2003, supra note 224, Part II. Iceland's
constitution explicitly provides for a right of privacy, stating that "[e]veryone shall enjoy
freedom from interference with privacy, home, and family life." See Const. of the Republic of
Iceland art. 71 l, available at http://govemment.is/constitution/.
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established by the HSD Act2 6 2 is insufficient for protecting
individuals' privacy. The Supreme Court's reasoning was two-fold:
first, the Act provided no specific guidance as to what type of
information must be encrypted in this manner; and second, the Court
interpreted the license to imply that after the deletion of an
individuals' name and address only personal identification number
needed to be encrypted.263 According to the Icelandic Supreme
Court's opinion, this ambiguous system does not adequately protect
one's privacy interests.2 64
The negative reaction the HSD Act encountered among the
medical and legal communities, combined with a shift in deCode's
own business model, eventually led deCode to announce that they do
265
not expect to operate the database under the terms of the HSD Act.

Nonetheless, the Icelandic experience remains important. Much can
be learned from this first attempt to build a population collection and
this experience strengthens the need for fair information practices in
this domain. This example further demonstrates both the risks and
benefits stemming from unrestricted flow of information between
public and private entities, as is discussed in the following subsection.
B. Risks and Benefits
To be certain, there are valuable aspects to partnerships between
public and private entities. Governments may hold vast amounts of
useful medical and genetic data, such as those in the Icelandic
medical records26 6 or the American National Pathology Repository,26 7
but may not have the resources, the technology, the capacity, or the
will to take full scientific advantage of it. Similarly, private entities
may have the aptitude but not the data to research.26 8 Thus,
partnerships between the public and private sectors are clearly
beneficial for both science and society.
Moreover, private companies that collaborate with public
institutions may be subject to stricter standards and greater public
scrutiny compared to private entities acting on their own, thus better
safeguarding privacy concerns. For instance, in contrast to the United
262. See supra note 238.
263. Gu6mundsd6ttir v. Iceland, No. 151/2003, supra note 224, Part IV.
264. Id.
265. deCode Genetics, Inc. Form 10-K (fiscal year ending December 31, 2003),
http://www.decode.com/files/file202415.pdf (last visited Nov. 2006).
266. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
268. See Petersen, supra note 10 and accompanying text.

2006]

GENETIC DATABASES AND BIOBANKS

States where there are no substantial restrictions on the transfer of
genetic information kept in private bio-repositories to third parties, 269
the Icelandic Health Sector Database Act prohibited the transport of
any of the Health Sector Database information outside of Iceland, and
mandated that all information processing is to be conducted in
Iceland.2 7 ° It is unlikely that such a broad limitation on the transfer of
information would have been established if the source of information
had not been the Icelandic government.
Still, these public-private partnerships hold many potential risks
to the privacy and autonomy of individuals. Such partnerships give
private companies with commercial, profit-driven motives access to
an immense amount of personal information that was originally given
to public institutions. It is not clear that individuals would otherwise
agree to contribute their tissue samples and genetic and medical
information to private, for-profit companies without proper
compensation. This highlights the need to limit such transfers of data
from one sector to the other to situations in which271 individuals
authorize such transfer through active informed consent.
Furthermore, unless individuals specifically agree to the transfer
of information from one sector to the other, public-private
partnerships that involve the transfer of DNA samples and medical
information between the two may undermine the autonomy and
control of the research subjects. If one views either one of the
collaborators, either the private sector or the public sector, as posing a
greater risk to her privacy interest compared to the other, the intersector transfer of information may intensify an individual's belief that
her rights are at risk. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly,
commercial companies are likely to have a different set of priorities
than those of public or non-profit institutions. As a result, the private
sector may be less appropriate as the sole keeper of vast amounts of
sensitive, personal information, especially if this data is easily linked
to identifiable information.
In order to address these concerns, the transfer of information
from one entity to another, regardless of sector, must be thoughtfully
regulated and practiced, so that the explicit consent of the participants
is obtained prior to such transfer. Moreover, it would be useful to

269. There are no such restrictions unless said third parties are insurance companies or
employers. See supra section III.C.4.
270. HSD Act, supra note 11, art. 10.
271.
For a different view see Kaye, supra note 37, at 131-32 (advocating for an opt-out
system for secondary uses of information in order to simplify the consent process).
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adopt a trustee model for keepers of genetic information and samples,
particularly when dealing with privately owned repositories, in order
to limit potential misuses. The U.K. Biobank, which has internalized
much of the criticism expressed on the Icelandic Health Sector
Database, rejected the commercial model adopted by Iceland, and
managed to structure a more data-subject friendly approach based on
a governmental-charitable structure. 272
C. Lessonsfrom Iceland. The U.K. Model
Aiming to be the largest population database in the world, with
human samples initially collected from 500,000 volunteers, the U.K.
Biobank is set to launch nationally at the end of 2006.273 It will

consist of a collection of blood and urine samples, information
regarding height, weight, and blood pressure, as well as additional
information collected via a questionnaire form from volunteers aged
40 to 69.274 The Biobank will monitor the health of the volunteers for
long periods of up to thirty years.2 75 Eventually this information is to
be linked to each data-subject's medical records.2 76
The purpose of the U.K. Biobank, as indicated by its founders, is
to provide a "unique resource for ethical research into genetic and
environmental factors that impact on human health and disease, to
improve the health of future generations." 277 The bank is to be an
information resource for investigating the "causes, courses, and
treatments of the common severe illnesses, and improving ways of
dealing with them, ' 278 and access to its collections will be granted to
both research institutions and commercial companies for a licensing

272. For the structure of the U.K. Biobank see
http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/about/organisation.php (last visited Nov. 2006). For further
discussion of the partnership approach adopted by the Biobank see Beatrice Godard et al.,
Strategies for Consulting with the Community: The Cases of Four Large-Scale Genetic
Databases,10(3) Sci. & ENGINEERING ETHICS, 457 (2004).
273. This announcement followed a 3-month pilot phase that took place in the Manchester
area. See http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/docs/UKBiobank%20rel.pdf (last visited Nov. 2006).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Interim Advisory Group on Ethics and Governance, supra note 13; UK Biobank
Ethics and Governance Framework, supra note 13, at Section I.B.2; J.V. McHale, Regulating
Genetic Databases:Some Legal and EthicalIssues, 12 MED. L. REv. 70, 78 (2004).

277. See U.K. Biobank Home Page, http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk (last visited Nov. 2006).
278. Setting Standards: The U.K. Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework, Sept. 24,
2003, http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/docs/egf-summary.doc.
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fee, in order to facilitate research and promote sharing of data and
findings.27 9
Unlike the Icelandic Health Sector Database, the U.K. Biobank
will operate on the basis of explicit consent,280 and volunteers will be
recruited on the basis of an opt-in regime. 28 1 However, conditional
consent, consent that allows participants to choose which part of the
data will be used, by whom, and for what purposes, will not be
available because of the difficulty of implementing this framework
within such a large scale database. 282 In the words of the Interim
Advisory Group on Ethics and Governance that accompanies the
project: "participation will have to be all or nothing - i.e., participants
will have to be either in or not in U.K. Biobank" (emphasis in
original).2 83
Notwithstanding this limitation, the participants in the project
would have the right to withdraw from it at any time.284 The U.K.
Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework (EGF) recognized three
possible degrees of withdrawal: complete withdrawal that includes a
request to destroy samples already collected; discontinued
participation, meaning that no further data will be collected but
continuous use of existing data will be permitted; and lastly, a request
that no further contact and communication will be made with the
participant, although the data already collected remains in the
database. 285 The EGF concluded that "[t]he principle of voluntariness
with little effort, at
requires that participants be allowed to withdraw
286
any time, and without having to give a reason."
In contrast to the commercial approach taken in the Icelandic
HSD Act, which grants a private company exclusive control over the
Health Sector Database, the U.K. Biobank project is funded by a
variety of public sources including: the Wellcome Trust, a medical
research charity; two governmental institutions: the Medical Research
279. Interim Advisory Group on Ethics and Governance, supra note 13, at 12-13; UK
Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework, supranote 13, at Section II.B.3. Organizations that
are expected to derive financial benefit will be charged a higher licensing fee.
280. UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework, supra note 13, at Section I.B.1.
281. Alan Doyle, Frances Rawle, & Peter Greenaway, The U.K Biobank, in SOCIETY AND
GENETIC INFORMATION: CODES AND LAWS IN THE GENETIC ERA 247, 247 (Judit Sdndor ed.,
2003); McHale, supra note 276, at 73.
282. Petersen, supra note 10, at 285.
283.
Interim Advisory Group on Ethics and Governance, supra note 13, at 6-7.
284. UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework, supra note 13, at Section I.B.6;
Doyle, Rawle, & Greenaway, supra note 281, at 259-60.
285. UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework, supra note 13, at Section I.B.6.
286. Interim Advisory Group on Ethics and Governance, supra note 13, at 10.
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Council (MRC), and the Department of Health; and the Scottish
Executive, the devolved government of Scotland.28 7 The U.K.
Biobank is publicly owned and is monitored by the independent body
of the Ethics and Governance Council.28 8 This construction was
289 and strives
designed to gain public trust
to promote an ongoing
290
public.
the
with
engagement
Another difference from the Icelandic model is that no single
commercial entity will have exclusive control over the U.K.
database. 29' Academic as well as commercial institutions will have
access to the database based on a case-by-case evaluation of the
research proposals and access will remain conditional upon adherence
to the ethical framework of the project.292
The sample collection and the database will be legally owned by
U.K. Biobank Limited.293 This means that participants in the project
will not have property rights in the samples they provide. Rather,
U.K. Biobank retains the right to sell or destroy the samples and
data.2 94 Even though the EGF stated that U.K. Biobank Ltd. does not
intend to exercise these rights to sell the samples or data collected,
designating the U.K. Biobank as a trustee, rather than the owner, of
the collection would have been more appropriate. The definition of a
trustee better fits with the Biobank's stated intention to serve as a
"'steward' of the resource, maintaining and building it for the public
good" as emphasized in the Ethics and Governance Framework.295
One of the main questions that the U.K. Biobank still faces is
who should be granted access to the information collected via this
project. Commercial companies, employers, and the insurance
industry are all examples of potentially problematic recipients of the
data. The U.K. Human Genetics Commission supports the view that
employers and insurers should not have access to individual genetic
information in order to prevent the misuse of the data collected and
protect the privacy interests of the participants. 96 Similarly, the
police or other law enforcement agencies will have access to the
287.
288.
289.

See http://www.ukbiobank.ac.uk/ (last visited Nov. 2006).
See http://www.egcukbiobank.org.uk/ (last visited Nov. 2006).
Doyle, Rawle, & Greenway, supra note 281, at 262-63.

290.

Interim Advisory Group on Ethics and Governance, supra note 13, at 9.

291.

Id. at 12.

292.

Id; UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework, supranote 13, at Section II.B. 1.
U.K. Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework, supra note 13, at Section II.A.

293.
294.

Id

295.

Id.

296.

U.K. Human Genetics Commission, supra note 33.
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database only under a court order so as to not deter public
participation.297 At the same time, commercial companies could gain
access to the data if the ethical framework set by the EGF is
followed.2 98
All identifying information, such as name and address, will be
removed and kept separately from the coded information and
samples. 299 Research users will only have access to anonymized data
and samples, and only a limited number of people will have access to
the decoder key necessary to re-identify the information.3 00 This
model rejects the public-private commercial collaboration seen in the
Icelandic Health Sector Database Act, and promotes a publiccharitable approach, which bestows data-subjects with greater control
over their personal information and its uses. Moreover, while the
Icelandic model followed a top-down approach in order to address
public concerns, the United Kingdom has followed a "partnership
approach" aiming to work with the public. 3 °'
Nevertheless, the U.K. model is not free of criticism.

30 2

Concerns

include the potential ability to link the genetic and health information
stored in the database with other data such as police or employment
records, the possibility that the project will undermine the public trust
in medical research, and the worry that the project has questionable
scientific efficiency because it was politically conceived.3 °3 The
project has also been criticized for permitting the disclosure of future
medical records, which may be yet unknown to the research subject,
under its informed consent policy. 30 4 Despite these concerns, this

charitable model, when compared to the Icelandic Health Sector
Database commercial model, seems to better protect the privacy and
autonomy interests of the data subjects while nonetheless striving to
enhance scientific knowledge.
The U.K. model is preferable to the Icelandic one in several
aspects. First, it rejects a market-type model. While the Icelandic
database was to be established and operated by a private company
that has exclusive control over it, the U.K. biobank is owned by U.K.
297.
298.

U.K. Biobank Ethics and Governance Framework, supra note 13, Section lI.B. 1.
Id.

299.

Id. at Section I.C.

300.
301.
at 163.
302.
303.
304.

Id.
See Beatrice Godard et al., supra note 272, at 458; see also Weldon, supra note 174,
See Petersen, supra note 10, at 278.
Id.
Rothstein, supra note 107, at 93-94.
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Biobank Limited, a company established by governmental and
charitable bodies for this purpose alone. This type of governance is
better suited to the task, as it is less subject to conflicting forces and
has the public's best interest at heart compared to a private company's
promotion of shareholder profits. Second, the U.K. model better
reflects the will and autonomy of the population as it features an optin framework, rather than the opt-out model offered under the
Icelandic HSD Act. In addition, the U.K. model promises an explicit
consent format, which better secures the autonomy of participants
when compared to the "blanket consent," granted to deCode in
Iceland. But even this model raises concerns as to the ability to truly
consent to the disclosure of unknown future medical conditions. The
fact that U.K. Biobank Limited retains ownership rights over the
information and samples stored in the database, including the right to
sell or destroy them, is also problematic. A preferable approach would
be to treat U.K. Biobank Ltd. as a trustee of the information, rather
than the owner; imposing clear limitations including restrictions on
the right to sell, transfer ownership, destroy, and reveal identifiable
information to third parties, other than for the research purposes
agreed to by the participants and authorized by an independent review
board.3 °5 These limitations are essential if an adequate degree of
control and protection is to be given to genetic privacy and to the
autonomy of the participants of the project.
D. Inductionsfor the U.S.
The Icelandic and the British experiences should serve as a
compass for the United States in its future treatment of personal
genetic information. The Icelandic model demonstrates some of the
potential dangers and the privacy breaches resulting from granting
private commercial companies extensive control over medical and
genetic information, including information initially collected by
public authorities prior to the creation of the database.30 6 The British
model, on the other hand, raises concerns as to the need to limit the
power and control held by the government and public institutions that
are responsible for collecting and handling medical and genetic
information and material.30 7 Absent formal limitations and
constraints, institutions are not restrained from destroying important
data collected or transferring samples and data collections to third
305.
306.
307.

See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
See supra section IV.A.
See supra section IV.C.
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parties without the explicit consent of the individuals to whom the
information pertains.3 °8 These concerns should be addressed in future
treatment of genetic information and genetic privacy, particularly as
science advances and more personal information could be derived
from our DNA.
At this point in time, it is unlikely that the private sector in the
United States will cease to collect and store genetic information. For
this reason, greater supervision on the conduct of the private sector
must take place; including limiting the control private companies
have over personal genetic information and material and empowering
the individuals to proactively control this information. Placing
constraints on genetic collections may be done in two different ways.
The first is by introducing formal, top-down regulations, enforced by
the government. The second requires the industry to place limitations
on itself in the form of specifically designed fair information practices
that will deal with the various privacy and autonomy concerns that
accompany genetic databases as raised throughout this article.
Self-regulation in the form of fair information practices has
many advantages over government regulation, including speed and
simplicity. 30 9 Moreover, a regime of fair information practices has

proven successful in protecting information privacy.310 Thus, fair
information practices that encompass the uniqueness of genetic
information and appropriately address issues of anonymity, usage,
and security may be well suited to the task.3 11 It is recommended that
all institutions that collect, store, or manage genetic or medical
information, either in the form of databases or biobanks, adopt the
following principles as a basis for their privacy policies:
Opt-in Regime: The most basic way to insure that data subjects
know and agree to be part of a genetic database or a biobank is to
have them actively consent to participate in it. This is especially
important since genetic databases and biobanks may contain some of
the most private and sensitive information and it is necessary that
each individual participating in such projects be aware of their
participation and consent to it. The best way to achieve this is by
308.

See supranote 294 and accompanying text.

309.

See suprasection III.C.

310.
See Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy:
(What Larry Doesn't Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 1,
44-46 (2001); Schwartz, European
Data Protection Law, supra note 110. For a different view see Campbell, supra note 112,
concluding that self-regulation did not live up to its expectations when applied to digital

television, public interest responsibilities, and to privacy protection on the Internet.
311.

SeeSamuelson, supranote 155, at 1169.
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adopting an opt-in framework, which requires active consent of
individuals prior to adding them into the database/biobank. In
contrast, an opt-out regime does not insure these important goals, but
rather perpetuates an existing situation.
Informed Consent: Data subjects should be asked to give explicit
informed consent to participate in the research, as well as to the types
of data processed, the organization or institution in charge of
assembling it, and the intended uses of the data collected. Participants
should further be made aware of any intent to link the data to other
types of databases.
Access: Individuals should have the right to access information
pertaining to them and have the ability to correct incorrect
information collected.
Withdrawal: Each participant in genetic databases or biobanks
should be given the opportunity to withdraw their participation in the
database at any given time. Withdrawal should be accompanied by
the possibility to request the deletion or destruction of information
and material already existing in the database/biobank.
Security: Strict and coherent means of security, including
encryption, should be implemented to safeguard the information
collected. Only coded information should be transferred from public
to private entities and the decoding key as well as identifiable
information must remain with the original holder, unless the
individual consented otherwise.
Confidentiality: Researchers should take strict measures to
ensure that the privacy and confidentiality of data subjects are
maintained. Identifiable information should be coded and kept
separate from collected samples. Only a limited number of people
should have access to the identifiable information or to the decoding
key. Privacy policies should be adopted and strictly followed by each
institution.
Ownership: Each privacy policy should be clear as to whether
the holders of the information view themselves as owners, holding
property rights over the data collected, or simply as trustees of the
information. The latter seems a better fit to this domain, and is hence
preferable. If, however, a property rights regime is maintained, it is
the use of the data collected in
crucial to place clear restrictions on
312
addition to limiting transferability.

312. The latter is an application of the "Hybrid inalienability" model proposed by Paul
Schwartz. See See Schwartz, Property, Privacy,andPersonalData, supra note 17, at 2090-94.
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Information Transfer: Each privacy policy should be explicit as
to its stance towards information transfer to third parties. Although
information sharing with third parties for research purposes should be
encouraged, it is recommended that clear limitations be placed on
other types of transfers. Specific guidelines should be provided to
protect individuals' privacy in the event that such transfers of
information occur outside the national borders by forcing the new
holder to honor a determined level of privacy mechanisms, set for this
purpose. In any event, transfers of identifiable information should not
take place absent the explicit consent of the participants.
Information Sharing: A distinction should be made between the
sharing of genetic information for research purposes and the sharing
of this information for any other purpose. It is advised that institutions
that hold genetic information or material follow an explicit policy that
prohibits transferring or revealing sensitive information to entities that
may make use of such information for discrimination purposes, such
as insurance companies or employers. Similarly, to maintain public
trust there should be a restriction against mixing military or criminal
databases with research databases without the explicit consent of the
research subjects. Genetic information should always be stripped of
any identifiable characteristics before sharing occurs, unless an
individual has explicitly consented otherwise.
Accountability: Lastly, it is crucial that institutions or personnel
that breach these principles are held accountable for their actions.
Government supervision of entities holding such sensitive
information or public "watchdog" organizations could ensure
accountability, 313in addition to compliance mechanisms set by the
industry itself.
In addition to this set of principles, and notwithstanding the
importance of self-regulation, government involvement is not to be
dismissed. Federal and local governments can and should encourage
the private sector to adopt these principles into standard practice by
providing economic incentives to those who comply thus regulating
the conduct of institutions in this domain.
One issue previously discussed specifically requires government
regulation and should not be left to self-regulation alone. This issue is
the mandate granted to the private sector over medical and genetic

313. Schwartz identifies three purposes for which supervising institutions are needed: 1) to
provide trading mechanisms; 2) to verify claims to propertized personal data; and 3) to police
compliance with the agreed-upon terms. See Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and PersonalData,
supra note 17, at 2110.
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information and material, and the freedom such mandates give to
transfer ownership to third parties.31 4 Collectors and holders of
genetic databases should not be recognized as the owner of the
medical and genetic information and material they collect, 15 but
rather should be legally categorized as trustees of the collections of
information and samples.31 6 Under this trustee mechanism, private
companies as well as public institutions would not be banned from
transferring identifiable medical and genetic collections to third
parties, but rather would be required to receive prior explicit consent
from each individual whose information is sought to be included in
the database. This will restore the control over personal genetic
information to individuals and will ensure that individuals know and
agree to the whereabouts and uses of their personal genetic
information.
V. CONCLUSION
This article examines the emergence of public and private
genetic databases and bio-repositories as well as the newly formed
partnerships between the public and private sectors in the genetic
realm. It calls for a prompt establishment of industry-wide fair
information practices for assembly, storage, use, and safeguarding of
genetic data, in order to adequately protect personal genetic privacy
and autonomy.
Lack of adequate limitations enable the private sector to gain
greater, almost limitless, control over personal genetic information
and material, ignoring the privacy and autonomy rights and needs of
individuals. Taking the privacy and autonomy of research subjects
seriously is not meant to undermine research, but rather safeguard
research subjects from possible misuses and establish public trust
crucial for future scientific endeavors. The best and quickest way to
insure the credibility of genetic databases and biobanks, and to protect
the privacy and autonomy of participants, is by adopting and
implementing rigorous fair information practices.

314. See discussion in section III.C.4 above.
315. The discussion above does not refer to the issue of ownership for intellectual property
purposes. Ownership by physicians, researchers, and companies for intellectual property
purposes over genetic discoveries derived from genetic material collected from volunteers, calls
for a different analysis that is out of the scope of this article.
316. See also supranote 197 and accompanying text.

